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ABSTRACT 
Since 1989 the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have undergone an 
unprecedented transition from communism to democracy. Establishment of democratic 
control of armed forces is an inseparable part of the process of consolidation of 
democracy. 
The purpose of this thesis is to define those factors that influence democratization 
of civil-military relations in post-communist countries in the process of transition to 
democracy. My argument is that countries develop democratic control of armed forces in 
different ways and with different time boundaries, until the end state is achieved. The 
democratization of civil-military relations depends on capability of the country in 
transition to effectively establish (by which I mean to build and put into effect) 
institutions for democratic control of the military.  
In evaluating development of the democratization of civil-military relations the 
post-communist countries of Hungary and Bulgaria are studied in detail with particular 
attention to the process of establishment, development, and interrelation of institutional 
arrangements. In this aspect historical legacy, international context and path of transition 
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Since 1989 countries of Central and Eastern Europe have undergone an 
unprecedented transition from communism to democracy. The end of the Cold War and 
dissolution of Warsaw Pact forced all post-communist countries to look for new security 
guarantees. As a solution, they unanimously declared a desire to join democratic Europe. 
They seek full-fledged integration within European and Euroatlantic institutions, such as 
the European Union and NATO. However, one of the preconditions for acceptance in the 
EU and NATO is establishment of strong democratic control of the armed forces. 
Simultaneously with the development of democratic institutions and the transition to 
market economy, democratization of civil-military relations has to take place. The 
transition to democracy of every post-communist country corresponds more or less with 
its capabilities or ambitions.  
In the process of establishing democratic civil-military relations some countries 
are more advanced than others. Hungary and Bulgaria managed in different ways and 
different periods of time to achieve the consolidation of democratic control of the armed 
forces. Their successes resulted in their invitation to join NATO: Hungary in 1997 and 
Bulgaria in 2002.  
The purpose of this thesis is to define those factors that influence democratization 
of civil-military relations in post-communist countries, which are a part of the process of 
transition to democracy. The Hungarian and Bulgarian experience in developing 
democratic civilian control of armed forces in the post-communist era can offer lessons to 
other post-communist countries, aspiring to develop closer relations with the Western 
democratic community. In particular, these lessons include the development of 
appropriate legal and institutional arrangements for exercising democratic civilian 
control, the importance of defining national security interests and problems, the need for 
appropriate defense planning.  
The cases of Hungary and Bulgaria are suitable for comparison in terms of 
drawing conclusions for ways of establishing democratic control of the Armed forces in 
Central and Eastern European post-communist countries because:  
1 
– they started reforms at the same time – in the late 1980s;  
– both are neighbors of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, which was troubled 
by continuous wars during the last decade of the 20th century and that 
undoubtedly could effect the process of development of democratic civil-
military relations in Hungary and Bulgaria; 
– they had standing armed forces, which they had to reform simultaneously with 
the democratization of the civil-military relations, not like Baltic states or 
Slovenia, for example, which established armed forces and civil-military 
relations from scratch. 
In general civil-military relations encompass the relations between armed forces 
and the society of which they are part. At the same time the democratic control of armed 
forces have to be understood as political control of the military by legitimate, 
democratically elected authorities of the state. Many scholars argue that one or another 
factor or condition is most important in developing the democratic civil-military 
relations. Huntington, for example, thinks that creating preconditions for maximizing 
military professionalism is of the first importance, while Desch claims that the existence 
of war or major external threat facilitates such control.1   
In this thesis I will analyze the establishment of democratic control of armed 
forces as a function of several factors including historical legacies, international context, 
and especially institutional arrangements in the process of transition to democracy. I will 
analyze the process of their development and evolution. I will try also to establish how 
the path of transition to democracy influences the process of establishing democratic 
control of the armed forces.  
The definition of the democratic control of the armed forces is necessary for 
proper evaluation of the achieved results in studied cases, therefore Chapter II considers 
theoretical aspects on that topic.  
                                                 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 83-85. 
Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, (Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
2 
Democratization of civil-military relations of post-communist countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe is not the end in itself for meeting requirements for full-
fledged membership in the EU and NATO. The establishment of democratic control over 
armed forces is of great importance for the process of consolidation of democracy. 
Democratic control of armed forces is inseparable from the democratization of the 
country. Linz and Stepan’s theory of transition to democracy presents a set of causal 
factors playing a role in this transformation.2 Schmitter also considers democratization of 
civil-military relations as a precondition for consolidation of democracy.3  
The importance of democratic control of the armed forces is indisputable. In order 
to assess prospects for its establishment it is important to evaluate the initial social, 
economic and political conditions in each country. In the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary 
the common communist past generated certain commonalities of civil-military relations, 
which are evaluated in Chapter II. The latter part of the chapter discusses factors that are 
used as independent variables, namely historical legacies, international context, path of 
transition and institutional arrangements.  
In Chapters III and IV the Hungarian and Bulgarian cases are studied in detail. In 
evaluating development of the democratization of civil-military relations, particular 
attention is given to the process of establishment, development, and interrelation of 
institutional arrangements. The establishment and development of institutions is studied 
as a function of specific political environments.  
In order to analyze deeply roots of the civil-military relations I study the manner 
of development and provisions of the strategic policy documents from which specific 
defense policies stem. My argument is that all countries develop democratic control of 
armed forces in different ways and with different time boundaries, until the end state is 
achieved. The democratization of civil-military relations depends on the capability of the 
country in transition to effectively establish (by which I mean to build and put into effect) 
institutions for democratic control of the military. In this aspect historical legacies can 
help or obstruct this process with the past patterns of civil-military relations. The 
                                                 
2 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
3 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences and 
Types”, from Geoffrey Pridham (ed.) Transitions to Democracy, (Aldershot: Dartmouth University Press, 1995), 535-
569. 
3 
international context can also play a significant role since in the contemporary 
environment all countries are in permanent interrelation, behaving according to certain 
established rules. The speed of the reforms definitely depends on the initial preconditions 
in every country, and hence the path of transition also is an important factor in 
development of democratic control of armed forces. 
The approaches for establishing democratic control of armed forces in every 
postcommunist country are different. The results they achieve also vary. In conclusion 
Chapter V assesses the nature of the development of democratic control of armed forces 
in Hungary and Bulgaria. It evaluates the role of all factors in the democratization of 
civil-military relations and determines positive as well as negative sides of the Hungarian 
and Bulgarian experience. It also defines deficiencies in civil-military relations.  
The methodology used for this thesis is a comparative analysis based on two case 
studies, which evaluates the establishment of democratic control of the armed forces in 
Hungary and Bulgaria, based on various phases of their history after 1989, and the use of 
scholarly and media sources including primary and secondary sources. Primary sources 
include news reports, official government publications, legal documents, and published 





II. THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES      
AND POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 
After the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the group of post-communist countries flowed into the 
Third wave of democratization.4 The process of transition from communism to 
democracy of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe influenced every aspect of 
their social life. Simultaneously with the tremendous changes of the political and 
economic life, the changes of civil-military relations were carried out. One of the basic 
principles of democracy is the principle of civilian control of the military. In the way 
toward democratization all post-communist countries met the problem of transforming 
the model of civilian control from one-party control to democratic control of the armed 
forces. This task is discussed in every forum and book, which covers the process of 
transition to democracy. The importance of this change is described well by Alfred 
Stepan’s words:  
Since the monopoly of the use of force is required for the modern 
democracy, failure to develop capacities to control the military represents 
an abdication of democratic power.5 
Although influenced by the positive Western example, the post-communist 
countries met various difficulties in establishing democratic control of the armed forces. 
These difficulties vary from country to country and solution they look for is also 
different.  
 
A. THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES 
 
1. Need for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
From ancient times and especially since establishment of the nation-states, society 
has needed a peacetime standing army to protect the sovereignty of the state and the issue 
of the civil-military relations has been relevant. Since the purpose of the army is to fulfill 
                                                 
4 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century, (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
5 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), xv. 
5 
one of the most important functions of the state, namely the “coercive function,” the 
armed forces possess most of the means of violence. As far as these means are to be used 
in defending the territorial integrity of the state, it presumes that any kind of misuse of 
the armed forces has to be avoided. Therefore putting this institution under control is the 
main objective of every society. As Richard Kohn writes: 
All forms of government, from the purest democracies to the most 
savage autocracies, whether they maintain order and gain compliance by 
consent or by coercion, must find the means to assure the obedience of 
their military – both to the regime in power and to the overall system of 
government.6 
In today’s world globalization has changed the means of state security, but despite 
all – a war is still possible. Strategic alliances and international diplomacy contributed to 
creation of an international security regime, but nevertheless almost all of the states rely 
upon a national military as the ultimate guarantor of national security. In these conditions 
and in an era of sophisticated armaments and new threats, democracies need stable and 
unambiguous systems of civilian control over the militaries.  
As far as a country may have civilian control without democracy, it cannot have 
democracy without civilian control. The principle of the democratic civilian control of 
armed forces is fundamental for democracy. According to Richard Kohn  
Civilian control allows a nation to base its values and purposes, its 
institutions and practices, on the popular will rather than on choices of 
military leaders, whose outlook by definition focuses on the need for 
internal order and external security.7   
 
2. Ambiguities of the Terminology  
While the need of civilian control is indisputable, the terminology used in the area 
of civil-military relations is still ambiguous. Many scholars cover the issue of control of 
the armed forces using different expressions. Currently “civilian control” and “political 
control”, according to Rudolf Joo, are used interchangeably. According to him “civilian” 
                                                 
6 Richard H. Kohn, “An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military”, available at www.unc.edu/, accessed 
November 15, 2003. 
7 Ibid.. 
6 
means “pre-eminence of civilian institutions, based on popular sovereignty, in the 
decision-making process concerning defense and security.”8  
The confusion of the usage of some terms as “democratic control,” “civilian 
control” and “democratization” of civil-military relations forced Andrew Cottey, Timothy 
Edmunds and Anthony Forster to clarify their meaning.9 For them “civil-military 
relations” cover all aspects of relations between armed forces and society, they are part 
of, and their domestic political function and position predetermine, a particular 
“relationship with the institutions and patterns in the society concerned.”10 In order to 
distinguish between “democratic control” and “civilian control,” terms used as 
interrelated or even synonyms, it is relevant to point out the example of the Soviet Union, 
where extremely strong civilian control existed, but which was in no way “democratic.” 
Contrariwise there have been democratic countries with a high level of civilian control 
where the militaries play a decisive role in implementation of defense policy like Italy, 
where the Ministry of Defense is dominated by the military.11 This confusion can lead to 
ambiguity in assessment of the level of democratic civil-military relations. From an 
analytical point of view the authors criticize definition of the “civilian control” to serve as 
a mean of analysis of civil-military relations only with regard to whether there is military 
intervention in domestic politics. This term just sets up “civilian sector against military 
sector in an assumed framework of a quest for influence.”12 At the same time “the 
concept of democratic control of armed forces adopts a wider and deeper approach to the 
issue, and entails a normative assessment on many different aspects and levels of civil-
military interactions.”13 
 
                                                  
8 Rudolf Joo, “The Democratic Control of Armed Forces”, Chaillot paper 23, available www.iss-eu.org accessed 
November 15, 2003.  
9 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 5. 
10 Ibid.. 
11 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, “Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and 
Eastern Europe: A Framework for understanding Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe”, TCMR paper 




3. Definition of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
Using different approaches to define the democratic control of the armed forces 
all of the scholars’ definitions converge in agreement that “…’democratic control’ of the 
armed forces should be understood in terms of political control of the military by the 
legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state.”14 The accountability of elected 
authorities before voters is one of the basic principles in representative democracies. The 
military, as they are constituted as a specific state institution, do not have such 
accountability. “Thus, it follows from the premise of popular sovereignty that only 
democratically constituted (elected) civilian authority can legitimately make policy, 
including defense and security policy.”15 
Here one should consider the problematique which Peter Feaver discusses about 
exercising of control over the military and the effectiveness of the armed forces. In order 
to fulfill their task for defending a country from possible external threats, the military 
should possess sufficient strength.16 But possessing the means of violence, will they obey 
the orders of civilians and will they not attempt to overthrow the democratic government? 
This is the dilemma: How to strike the balance between giving the military coercive 
power and ensuring that they remain obedient and do not seize political power. Like most 
scholars Feaver accepts the military as experts and he asserts that in a democracy the 
“…military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that 
threat for a given level of risk, but only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for 
society.”17  
In accordance to Feaver’s conclusions Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin in their 
work “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits” state that the principle 
of civilian control has two parts: 
…the ends of government policy are to be set by civilians; the 
military is limited to decisions about means; 
                                                 
14 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, pg. 6, The same statement can be drawn from Richard Kohn and Rudolf 
Joo too.  
15 Rudolf Joo, “The Democratic Control of Armed Forces.” 
16 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Reviews – Political Science, 1999. 
17 Ibid.. 
8 
…it is for the civilian leadership to decide where the line between 
ends and means (and hence between civilian and military responsibility) is 
to be drawn.18  
 
4. Scope of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces  
Summarizing the ideas from all of the approaches it could be concluded that the 
democratic political control of the military involves three separate but interrelated issues: 
The first covers the idea of the intervention of the military in domestic politics.19 Being 
established as an institution for preserving the state from external threats, every 
intervention of the military in domestic politics changes their function and thus misuses 
their capabilities and deteriorates their professionalism. Thus “the democratic control of 
the military is based on the core normative assumption that the military should not be 
involved in domestic politics and should remain the apolitical servant of the democratic 
government.”20 In democracy there are strong constitutional prerequisites which protect 
the state from two possible dangers: from politicians who have military ambitions and 
who would like to use military forces to achieve political goals; and from militaries who 
have political ambitions.  
The second element of democratic control of the armed forces is related to the 
control of defense policy. In a democracy, the voters authorize any elected government 
with the power, “to determine the size, type and composition of armed forces; to define 
concepts, to presents programmes, to propose budgets, etc., for which it needs 
confirmation by the legislature;” and the voters hold their government accountable for 
these issues.21 The democratic control implies that military should conform to the 
decisions of the civilians and implement them. On the other hand the military are not 
excluded from the decision-making process and the civilians should rely on the 
professionalism and expertise of the military in developing their decisions. Therefore, 
                                                 
18 Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits”, Armed Forces 
and Society, Fall 1992, Vol 19, No 1, 8.  
19 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe”, TCMR paper 1.7, available at http://civil-
military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk, accessed November 8, 2003. The authors describe these as “three levels of analysis.” 
20 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, 6. 
21 Rudolf Joo, “The Democratic Control of Armed Forces.” 
9 
representatives of the military establishment can have great influence, but only in the 
early stages of the decision-making process. Rudolf Joo states that at this stage of 
decision-making process “they can – and should, if needed – express opposing or critical 
views in the internal debate on the main strategic options.”22 Even the long-established 
democracies in Western Europe and North America experience tensions in balancing 
civil control and professional military expertise.  
The role of the militaries in the foreign policy and especially decisions on the use 
of military force is the third element of the democratic control of the military. Again the 
“democratic control of the military implies that the state’s foreign policy, including 
decisions on the deployment and use of force, should be under control of democratic 
civilian authorities.”23 The decision-making process here follows the same procedure as 
in defining the defense policy and the military can be used only as experts and advisors in 
this complicated and typically military area of conducting military operations. The issue 
here again is to find the appropriate balance between the civilian control and the 
professional military expertise in order for the assigned roles and missions of the armed 
forces to be fulfilled. The existing interrelations between civilian and military may lead to 
tensions even in long-established democracies. An example of this is the argument 
between the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and General Colin Powell concerning 
carrying out air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. There still is an open debate 
over whether the military is more prone than the civilians to use force or whether the 
modern professional armed forces are conservative and do not like military 
adventurism.24  
 
5. Requirements of Existence of Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
In summarizing of all discussed above, we should say that the core task of a 
democracy is to exercise political supervision of the military in order to preserve a 
pluralistic system. Rudolf Joo finds that Western democracies have many similar or 
identical political institutions and societal conditions that support the principle of the 
                                                 
22 Ibid.. 
23 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, 6. 
24 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 96-7. 
10 
civilian direction of the armed forces. He determines seven general requirements – 
societal, institutional and procedural, which constitute the democratic model of civilian 
control of the armed forces:  
– the existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining 
the basic relationship between the state and armed forces. On the one 
hand, this provides an important prerequisite of the functioning of the 
rule of law; on the other, it reduces the risks of uncertain jurisdictional 
claims, which can give rise to tension among separate parts of the 
political authority as well as between the political and military 
establishments;  
– the significant role of parliament in legislating on defense and security 
matters, in influencing the formulation of national strategy, in 
contributing transparency to decisions concerning defense and security 
policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling spending – using 
‘the power of the purse’ in issues related to ‘the power of the sword’;  
– the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government 
through a civilian organ of public administration – a ministry or 
department of defense – that is charged, as a general rule, with the 
direction/supervision of its activity. In most of the liberal democracies 
the central organization of defense is headed by an elected civilian 
politician, who is assisted by a number of qualified civilians (civil 
servants, political appointees, advisers etc.), who work together with 
military officers in carrying out strategic planning and coordination 
tasks;  
– the presence of a well trained and experienced professional military 
corps that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It 
acknowledges the principle of civilian control, including the principle 
of political neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces;  
– the civilian and uniformed defense authorities divide their 
responsibilities in such a way that political authority and 
accountability on the one hand, and military professionalism and 
expertise on the other, are maximized;  
– the existence of a developed civil society, with a long-standing 
practice and tradition of democratic institutions and values that is able 
to resolve societal conflicts in an effective and efficient manner, and, 
as a part of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the role 
and mission of the military;  
– the presence of a strong non-governmental component within the 
defense community (independent academics, media experts, advisers 
to political parties, etc.) capable of participating in public debate on 
defense and security policy, presenting alternative views and 
programmes. 25 
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Analyzing these prescribed requirements for democratic control of the armed 
forces we can see that the policy-making process may differ from country to country 
because of their constitutional requirements. Joo continues that it is obvious that if we 
take a look at the parliamentary and presidential government the respective institutions 
exercising democratic control of the military would vary. In parliamentary democracies, 
the Prime Minister and the cabinet form the executive branch, answerable to the elected 
parliament for the policy that it pursues. In the presidential system, the popularly elected 
head of the state has, as a general rule, a large constitutional role in the defining the 
defense and security policy.26 Each model has an impact on the way in which:  
– strategic choices and policy options are determined;  
– implementation and management processes are built up;  
– questions related to military institutional obedience and loyalty (who 
reports to whom, and when) are settled.27 
According to Rudolf Joo, the specific constitutional arrangements are not the only 
factors that regulate civil-military relations. They are influenced also by a country’s 
“historical traditions, sociological characteristics and the evolution of the domestic and 
international environment.”28 For instance the changing international environment after 
the end of the Cold War, and especially after the terrorist attacks from September 11, 
2001 lead to changes in the roles and missions of the military.  
 
B. FACTORS, SHAPING DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
1. Particularities of Communist Legacies in Civil-Military Relations 
before 1989 
Before 1989, the political regime in Central and Eastern Europe was based on the 
total subordination of the state institutions to the Communist Party. In this aspect civil-
military relations during the communist period were dominated by the Communist Party 
leadership. The civilian control over the military was a function of the Communist Party 





rather than the government’s prerogative. The Communist Party exercised strong political 
control using the party membership of the command staff (officers and NCOs) and 
especially the high-ranking officers. As members of the party the military were 
accountable before it. At the same time they had responsibilities as military professionals 
to their commanders. This means that military had to manifest loyalty to both the 
Communist Party and the armed forces and thus “system of dual loyalty” was 
established.29  
Membership in the Communist Party was required for a good career.30 The 
Minister of Defense was the highest military and usually he was a member of the 
Communist Party Central Committee or even of the Politburo. Some officers were 
involved in party committees at local level, although, in most of the cases the 
involvement of the militaries in leading party structures was accepted mostly as expertise. 
In order to further deepen Party control, Party cells were established in all military units. 
In most of these structures the Communist Party penetrated the military at all levels and 
“set up open as well as secret channels to monitor the allegiance of the officer corps to 
the regime.”31 In this respect the party cells were a source of open information, and 
military counterintelligence – of secret information. In addition wide indoctrination of 
communist ideology was carried out at all levels of the military educational system.  
The armed forces were highly politicized by involvement of the militaries in high 
posts of the ruling bodies of the Communist Party, by presenting the Party structures in 
all levels of military establishment, and by embodiment of the ideological aspects of 
professional military education. Оn the other hand, the military was subject of strong and 
direct control, and an engagement in the domestic politics, as an institution, was 
impossible. Due to the respect of the political control of the Communist Party, the 
establishment of democratic civilian control over the armed forces in the post-communist 
                                                 
29 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, 3. 
30 Vasil Danov, “Comparative Analysis of the Reforms in the Armies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
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31 Thomas Szayna and Stephen Larabee, East European Military Reform after the Cold War. Implications for the 
United States (Santa Monica, RAND, 1995), 6. 
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countries met with fewer challenges than those in Latin American. After 1989, the 
civilian leadership over the military was not contested. As Szayna and Larabee pointed 
out: 
The communist regimes in Eastern Europe maintained firm control 
over their militaries. In this sense, the political transition in Eastern 
Europe did not entail the ‘return of the military to the barracks.’ The 
military was already in the barracks and it respected the principle of 
civilian control as a fundamental tenet of civil-military relations.32   
 
The levels of politicization of the military varied from country to country. This 
was related to general policy of the Communist Party towards the state institutions. In 
Poland, for example, the opposition leader Lech Walesa said that the military were like 
radish – red outside and white inside, which is why they did not act against the process of 
transition to democracy in late 1980s. The degree of politicization of the military also 
varied during different time periods. A highly politicized pattern was peculiar to the 
1950s, while in the 1980s militaries in Central and Eastern Europe were more concerned 
with professionalization and the Party’s influence over the armed forces decreased.33  
As another element of the communist legacy, that posed an impediment to the 
democratization of civil-military relations, was the military involvement in the defense 
planning process. In return for obeying civilian control by non-involvement in domestic 
politics, the militaries enjoyed a high level of autonomy in the development and 
implementation of defense policy.34  
As a consequence, when the communist system collapsed, new 
governments faced weak executive/governmental control of defense 
policy, few systems for financial management of defense, non-existent 
parliamentary oversight of defense policy, defense ministries staffed 
largely by the military and which were themselves effectively subordinate 
to separate General Staffs, and little or no civilian or non-governmental 
expertise in defense matters. These problems were compounded by a 
culture of military independence and resistance to civilian control in 
relation to the development and implementation of defense policy. 35 
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34 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, 4. 
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2. Importance of the Institutions 
In a transition to democracy, the establishment of democratic institutions is the 
first priority. The institutions exercising democratic control of the military should be 
among the first to operate. Their existence and effectiveness in managing defense and 
military policy is of major importance for civil-military relations.  
The Central and Eastern European countries were challenged replacing 
communist institutions with democratic institutions. The main issue here is not only the 
existence of such institutions, but also of their effective work. Do the newly-established 
institutions really participate in military and defense planning process, and if they do – 
from which stage they are involved? Are they really in charge of taking the decisions on 
defense spending, force structure, procurement, etc.?  
Once the institutions are established they start to influence individuals’ behavior. 
When talking about the democratic control of armed forces and the institutions that exert 
it, we should address “…the problem of effectiveness, to see whether the military can 
actually fulfill the roles and missions assigned to it by civilian leadership.”36 The 
relationship between power and effectiveness in this case is immediate and they are 
inseparable. 
There are two aspects that we should keep in mind when we examine the origins 
of institutions: the goals and motivations of the actors involved in creation of these 
institutions; and the existence of an excessive number of institutions nowadays. 
Considering the excessive institutional presence Bruneau asserts that “… there are a finite 
number of models for democratic civil-military relations;” and level of applicability of 
the models from one country and one context to another country with another context is a 
challenge for the scholars.37 This correlates with the argument that “…in all democracies, 
new and old, issues of civil-military relations are fundamentally the same,” which is 
based on the assumption that in democracy elected authorities are in charge for the 
defense policy, and that after the end of the Cold War the tasks of the armed forces in 
every democracy are the same. 38 
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37 Ibid., 4. 
38 Ibid., 3. 
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Looking for institutional factors which influence the civil-military relations, one 
should consider a range of institutional arrangements, including constitutional and legal 
framework, legislative oversight and executive control as aspects of the democratic 
control of the armed forces.  
Constitutional and legal frameworks should be in place and effectively cover 
“operational control of the armed forces in both peace-time and war-time, as well as 
whether or not it addresses issues of control and development of defense policy.”39 These 
frameworks should define unambiguously the responsibilities of the civilian and military 
sector in defense planning. 
The legislative oversight is of major importance for the democratic civil-military 
relations. The legislature should keep under scrutiny not only the military, but also 
oversee how the executive authority exercises the control over the armed forces, and the 
development and implementation of defense policy. The legislature usually implements 
these roles by establishing respective committees, focused on military issues, and 
therefore is able to develop expertise in this area. The legislature also employs procedures 
such as hearings, parliamentary debates, approval of defense budgets, etc., to exercise its 
functions in oversight.  
Executive oversight concerns the division of power and responsibility in 
exercising control of the military. It defines the power and responsibilities of all 
executive bodies, elected and appointed, involved in this process, such as “President, 
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Government, other bodies (such as National 
Security Council) and the Chief of General Staff with regard to peace-time operational 
control of the military, war-time operational control and the development and control of 
defense policy.”40 This distribution of power and responsibilities is usually 
constitutionally defined, but the question is to what extent this is implemented, in the 
terms of the civilian expertise in the military area? In general the distribution of power 
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and responsibilities has to be unambiguous, to be accepted by the militaries and to allow 
the civilians to be independent in exerting democratic control of the armed forces.41 
The Ministry of Defense is one of the most important actors exercising 
democratic control of the military in its direct relationship with the Chief of General Staff 
and Armed Forces. Here again, some ambiguity in defining responsibilities is 
inadmissible. Unambiguous definition is needed in order the relationships to be clear. The 
civilian expertise at that level is very important when developing and implementing the 
defense policy. Thus the Ministry of Defense would show independence of the General 
Staff from the expert opinion and the exercised democratic control would be more 
effective. 
 
3. Historical Legacies 
Considering the democratization of the civil-military relations within a certain 
country we definitely should take into account historical legacies of these relations. In the 
case of the post-communist countries, it is important to know not only their heritage from 
the communist time (which as we described above is twofold – positive and negative), 
but also patterns of civil-military relations in these states during pre-communist times. It 
is not irrelevant for the armed forces in the post-communist countries in transition to 
decide to re-establish pre-communist model of civil-military relations. The closest way to 
change the communist civil-military relations is to return back to the national patterns. 
This assumption is not damaging if the heritage has democratic roots. But what if the 
heritage in the area of military culture from the prewar period allows the military to play 
a role in the domestic politics, for example? If they had such an experience in the past we 
should consider this fact in order to avoid some misjudgments in possible trend of 
development of civil-military relations.  
 
4. The Path of Transition to Democracy 
The way the transition to democracy proceeds would apparently play an important 
role for the easier and faster transformation to democratic civil-military relations, since 
they are in close relation with democratization of the country. The post-communist 
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regimes are referred as early post-totalitarianism, frozen post-totalitarianism, and mature 
post-totalitarianism depending on social and economic condition in these countries. The 
evolution of these types of totalitarianism usually leads to detolitarianization in different 
ways. The different types post-communist regimes follow different way of transition and 
the negotiated transition is argued to present the best opportunity for transformation of 
the old system to democracy. The negotiated transition is based on existence of more 
developed civil, political and economic society, obedience to the rule of law and more 
developed state apparatus, therefore transformation usually proceeds smoothly. Smooth 
transitions eventually present good conditions for easy and fast transition to democratic 
civil-military relations.42  
 
5. International Context 
The formation of the patterns of the civil-military relations can be significantly 
influenced by the international factors. These factors can come from international 
regimes in form of pressure to establish democratic control of the armed forces and 
military disengagement from politics, as this is a wide-accepted international norm of 
democracy.  
One of the most influential international factors that shape the development of 
democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern European countries is the 
Western democratic community. The ways of influence are two: by repeating the already 
existing patterns of civil-military relations and by pushing the reforms in these countries 
through the international actors. First – while striving to achieve the values of the 
Western democracies, Central and Eastern European countries are prone to repeat their 
models of civil-military relations. The second one stems from the aspiration of the new 
democracies to join European democratic community with all its institutions as European 
Union, NATO, etc. This desire of integration gives to the West a powerful leverage for 
influence. Together with the democratic reforms the Western support covers 
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democratization of civil-military relations as well. Special policies are designed to 
support development of civil-military relations such as the NATO Partnership for Peace 
program.  
Having in mind a common communist past and the role of the Soviet Union as 
ideological hegemon, we should consider an additional external factor – the influence of 
Russia over establishment of the democratic control of the military in post-communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The influence is more significant for the 
countries from former Soviet Union, since Russia declares its priorities in countries of 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Dealing with them as strategic allies it extends support for 
them and thus diminishes the pressure for the democratization of civil-military relations. 
The existence of external security threats and on-going conflicts may also have an 
impact on civil-military relations, which is close to Desch’s argument that external 
threats improve political control of the armed forces. He claims that existence of external 
threat draws the attention of civilians to the armed forces and therefore facilitates civilian 
control of the military.43 But another situation is also possible: the existence of 
significant threats to the national security or on-going conflict makes the armed forces an 
especially important institution, raising their domestic significance and influence. Such a 
perception of significance and uniqueness may allow the military to overrun the threshold 
and to intervene in domestic politics.44 As an illustration, the Yugoslav conflict generated 
and legitimized highly politicized militaries in Serbia and Croatia.  
 
C. CONCLUSION  
 
During the last decade of the 20th century post-communist countries in Central 
and East Europe have started transitioning toward democratization of their societies. 
Since existence of democratic control of the armed forces is required, such a transition to 
lead to consolidated democracy and the reforms in all of these countries included decisive 
steps in this direction.  
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The democratic control of the military is the core element of the democratic civil-
military relations and must be understood as political control of the military provided by 
the democratically elected authorities. Establishing democratic control of the armed 
forces depends on number of factors, but I will analyze how the historical legacies, 
domestic institutional arrangements, and international context influence democratization 
of civil-military relations in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and especially Hungary and Bulgaria. I will also examine what the relationship between 
the path of transition to democracy and the institutionalization of the democratic control 
























III. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY                 
RELATIONS IN HUNGARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Hungary is among those post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
whose smooth transition to democracy is accepted as one of the most successful. Its 
economy has recovered most flexibly from the shock of the transition to market 
regulation and by “late 1990s [its] per capita GDP exceeded that of the late 1980s.” The 
establishment of the new Hungarian institutions was carried out in accordance with the 
democratic rules and values, and was strongly supported by the population. The Western 
democratic community assessed Hungary’s success in establishing the liberal democracy 
by its acceptance in the international organizations that Hungary applied for. 
Between 1990 and 2004 the country either joined or will join each 
organization to which it has aspired, ranging from the Council of Europe 
(1990), the OECD (1996), NATO (1999) and to the European Union 
(expectantly 2004).45 
The democratization of the civil-military relations and the establishment of 
democratic control of the armed forces were among the first tasks solved by Hungarian 
political elite during the transition. The problems were discussed at a round table even 
before the Hungarian system had been transformed and the first changes towards 
democratization of the civil-military relations were presented before the first democratic 
elections. Despite the fact that some analysts of modern Hungarian civil-military relations 
have found a lot of problems, no one can reject the early success of the transformation of 
the communist civil-military relations to democratic forms.  
This chapter analyzes the course of democratization of civil-military relations in 
Hungary and factors that influenced it.  
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B. HISTORICAL LEGACIES  
 
1. Pre-Communist Legacy 
A-thousand-year-old Hungary is not very proud of its combat history during the 
last five centuries. It lost all wars in which it participated between 1487 and 1991 and 
failed to defend itself against the Soviet invasion in 1956.46 The history of Hungary is 
full of occupations, lost wars and loss of territory. “Tartars, Turks, Austrians and Soviets 
invaded and often held the country occupied.”47 One possible reason for these unhappy 
historical periods could be Hungary’s geographical position – situated in the open mid-
Danubian plains, without any natural obstacles and vulnerable to invasions, and at the 
same time neighboring great powers such as Germany and Russia. Although the armed 
forces could find good excuses for their bad performance in geography, all analysts state 
that these failures contributed to the deterioration of the popular prestige of the military.  
As part of Austria-Hungary Empire, after a long lasting and obstinate fight for 
independence, Hungary managed to gain a semblance of autonomy from the Habsburg 
rule after the 1867 Ausgleich (compromise).48 Hungary was allowed to establish her own 
institutions - Parliament and Cabinet, but the armed forces were commanded jointly with 
Austria.  
Although the “common” ministry of defense administered the 
imperial and royal armies, the emperor acted as their commander in chief, 
and German remained the language of command in the military as a 
whole.49  
During the times before World War I (1867-1918) Hungarians, who occupied 
command positions in the Empire’s army, used the German language for command and 
communication and hence it could not be said that this was a national experience in the 
civil-military relations.  
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Hungary received its opportunity to establish a fully independent state after the 
dissolution of the Austria-Hungary Empire after World War I. Hungary was compelled to 
sign the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920. The price of the independence was very harsh 
– Hungary lost two-thirds of its prewar territory and three-fifths of its population.50 (See 
Appendix A.) Considering the loss of important infrastructure and access to raw 
materials, it is easy to assume a historically hostile attitude of the Hungarians toward 
their neighbors. This attitude reached its peaks of chauvinism and even irredentism and 
played a decisive role in Hungarian foreign policy after the Treaty was signed. For 
instance, Hungary’s alliance with Hitler during World War II was inspired by hopes to 
repair the injustice of the Treaty of Trianon. As a consequence, Hungary was defeated 
and the attempt to establish properly functioning armed forces in the interwar period 
finished with a loss of credibility in post World War II period.51 Hungary had the 
opportunity to develop democratic civil-military relations only for a short period of time 
before joining Hitler. 
 
2. Communist Legacy  
After the war, as part of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), Hungary lost the 
opportunity to conduct an independent defense and security policy and the Soviet type of 
civil-military relations were established. Hungary’s strategic role was limited to 
“springboard in the northern part of the southern tier of the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
(WTO). Its formal role was to hold the territory of the country in event of Western 
aggression until reinforcements arrived from the Soviet Union.”52 What is more, the 
WTO developed strategic plans for invasion of northern Italy and Bavaria, and Hungary 
was seen as a primary supporter.53 Having in mind the existing historical, religious and 
social links, these tasks would never enjoy popular support.  
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Pal Dunay thinks that “the only occasion when the military might have played an 
important role in domestic politics occurred in October 1956.” 54 Commenting on these 
events Janos Simon said: 
…in 1956 the [Hungarian] military either supported the revolution 
or deserted from the army, but there was no organized force which 
supported Russian invasion.55  
The aftermath of this disobedience was the spontaneous disbanding of most of the 
units and loss of trust in the Armed forces by the Communist leadership. Therefore after 
the suppression of the revolution by the Soviet troops after 1956, as a substitute for the 
military the so-called “Workers’ Guard” was established – a paramilitary organization, 
trusted by the Communist Party.56 The Hungarian Army was reorganized, and the 
Communist Party control was strengthened.  The officers were forced to sign a 
declaration “and pledged to serve the new government and to fight unfailingly against the 
regime’s external and internal enemies” and 80 percent of them did sign it.57  
After 1945, as in all communist countries, the Communist Party rigidly exercised 
the control over the armed forces. Its institutions – the Politburo and Central Committee 
were constituted by a system of cooptation initiated from the top. However as a result of 
the events in 1956 and the lack of credibility in the military, Hungary was the only 
socialist country in which a high level military commander was not member of the 
Political Bureau. The Communist Party influenced the armed forces using different 
methods. Indoctrination of the Marxist ideology into the educational process of the 
military cadres was carried out. The Main Political Department (MPD) exercised the 
immediate control within the armed forces. The leverage of the Communist Party control 
over the professional military was the MPD and its structures, spread in each unit. It 
participated in all activities, including the defense planning process. This network of 
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structures and the political officers, maintained by the MPD, were usually not well 
accepted by the Hungarian professional military. “Very often the professional military 
considered the activity of the political officers a useless exercise, diverting time and 
energy from real duty, or simply violating privacy of the servicemen.”58  
The Communist leadership did not trust the military and therefore did not pay 
attention to their needs. When in mid-1960s the reformation of the country started, Janos 
Kadar had seen the main contribution of the Armed forces to stability of the country as 
“better not costing so much.”59 This way the domestic economic stability would not be 
undermined and the Hungarian economic invention – the so-called “Goulash 
Communism” – would survive. Although the Soviet leadership pushed the Hungarian 
leadership to renovate military equipment, the attitude of the Hungarian Communist 
leadership to the military slowed down the modernization of the armed forces, and by 
1989 they were a “comparatively poor, outmoded military, free of prestige.”60 In this 
aspect the Hungarian experience is unique among the communist countries because Janos 
Kadar was strong enough to oppose the Soviet pressure and to defend the Hungarian 
national interests. 
The political control exercised by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) 
up to 1990 was rigid and non-democratic because it was exercised by an “institution 
based on denial of democracy.”61 Getting used to strong control, the armed forces 
accepted the changes in the system in 1989 very easily, although the new type of control 
was completely different from before. What is more, the professional militaries had a 
special attitude to the systemic change – “they were happy to get out of the ambit of two 
heavily disliked bodies – the Soviet military and Hungarian political officers.”62  The 
same attitude made the General Staff believe that no one was allowed to interfere in 
military matters, which made the first years of establishing democratic control of the 
armed forces difficult. 63 
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In summary, the geographical situation of Hungary placed it under foreign 
domination for a long time, and therefore to establish nation state and national armed 
forces until the end of the World War I was not possible. Therefore Hungary’s 
procommunist and communist experience in civil-military relations is not so rich. The 
interwar period, as an opportunity to build democratic civil-military relations, was missed 
and in 1941 Hungary joined Hitler in World War II. After the subsequent defeat, Hungary 
was under Soviet control, a communist regime was established and the Communist Party 
controlled the armed forces. The strong totalitarian control exercised then, made the 
military susceptible to the democratic civilian control when the system changed. The 
Hungarian military have never interfered in domestic politics, so their prestige rose 
recently.  
 
C. PATH OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
 
The nature of the Hungary’s transition from communism to democracy in the end 
of 1980s was unique. It has some similarities with Poland. In both cases the reformist 
elements within the communist elite agreed a negotiated transition with the democratic 
opposition movements. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan determined Hungary as “the world’s 
leading example of mature post-totalitarianism” by mid-1980s.64 The changes in Hungary 
were gradual and the process started long before 1989. From 1956 there was considerable 
political stability in Hungary. Kadarist policy opened possibilities for enterpreneurship in 
the second economy, and formation of a civil society on the level of economics. At the 
Central Committee’s Plenum in March, 1962 Kadar advocated “politics of alliance” and 
thus supported the line of passive compliance, rather than totalitarian one.65 Then he 
distinguished himself from his predecessor Matyas Rakosi and announced: “whereas 
Rakosites said that someone who is not on our side is against us, we say, those who are 
not against us are with us.”66  A very important step towards detotalitarianization was the 
New Economic Mechanism, introduced in 1968, which further eroded the Communist 
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ideology by allowing free movement within the country, part-time private work and small 
private industry thus pushing Hungary away from the totalitarianism. The regulations 
adopted in 1982 for property rights and the legalization of the second economy created 
preconditions for establishing a broader and more organized group of entrepreneurs, 
which by the 1980s became the mainstay of the economic society.67  
In 1988 a civil society also started to emerge in forms of self-organized 
association groups. The ecological movements were the most powerful at that time, for 
example, against a dam on the Danube River. These movements played a role in 
advancing the freedom of speech and even assisting “civil (and later political) society 
with sufficient expertise to review actively the growing number of legal and 
constitutional proposals being raised both by the regime and by the new social groups.”68 
The economic problems, experienced by Kadar’s regime in 1980s, created 
preconditions for development of a broad protest movement in Hungary. By 1989 
Hungary had the world’s largest debt per capita – $1,561, dwarfing Brazil’s $622 per 
capita debt.69 The Party reformers became more critical to Kadar’s policy and sought 
support from the opposition movements. In fact in that period the close relationship 
between the party moderates and the opposition was set up – the leader of the communist 
moderates Imre Pozsgay attended the organizational meeting of the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum in October 1987. Neither the moderate communists nor the moderate 
opposition thought they could succeed in leading the changes of the system on their own, 
therefore negotiations were the only possible way. This process was assisted by the 
Army’s attitude of non-intervention in domestic politics.70  
Established before the system transformation, based on an intellectual subculture, 
and gaining wide popular support, the Hungarian opposition had much bargaining 
leverage with the reformers of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party.  
In recognizing the legitimacy of the multiparty elections in 1988, the HSWP 
opened the way to the transformation. The Round Table between HSWP and the 
democratic opposition was set up. Not long before the negotiations had started, the 
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opposition carried out the so-called “Opposition Round Table” for attaining an internal 
agreement about the negotiation strategy and thus its bargaining capabilities were 
improved. Apart from the decision on the necessity of free elections, one of the most 
important outcomes of the Round Table talks was the agreement about the changes in the 
Constitution.71 
The democratic consolidation in Hungary proceeded easily because, as I 
mentioned above, the reforms started well before the system changes occurred and the 
political and economic elite were better prepared to establish democratic political 
institutions and introduce the market economy.  
The country was also more open and ‘Westernized’ than most 
other states in the region.  A mental preparedness for a new system was 
present, and the private ownership of companies and multiparty politics 
were not alien concept to many Hungarians.72  
Although it was not successful, the democratic revolution in Hungary in 1956 
started a period of transformation of the country from totalitarian to post-totalitarian. 
Gradually developing its economic, political and civilian societies, by 1989 Hungary was 
the only country among all Central and Eastern European countries, where the transition 
to democracy started with negotiations between the communist leadership and the 
democratic opposition, without any previous disturbances.  
 
D. SETTING UP THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED 
FORCES 
 
The negotiated nature of the transition in Hungary assumed a good co-operation 
between the political parties and the gradual establishment of the new democratic 
institutions. The development of the new pattern of civil-military relations followed the 
same pattern of gradual changes. Among the topics discussed at the National Round 
Table were several demands of the democratic opposition, related to the national defense, 
which had been formulated as early as 1987-88: de-communization of the armed forces; 
disbandment of Workers’ Militia; as well as the departure of the Soviet troops from the 
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Hungarian territory.73 At the beginning even the reformation wing of the HSWP opposed 
these ideas, but then slowly accepted and even implemented some of them. For instance, 
they introduced a new oath on August 20, 1989, which no longer included “the pledge of 
loyalty to the Communist Party and the ‘unconquerable ideals of socialism’, but instead 
spoke of the soldiers’ obligation to his nation.”74 In October 1989 they dismantled the 
structures of the Communist Party and its youth organizations within the army. The 
Workers’ Militia was disbanded in October 1989 and as Dunay thinks it was “…the only 
politically urgent matter concerning military and paramilitary forces in the process of 
system change…”75 
The decisions of the Round Table established a new institutional framework, 
which was ingrained in the amended Constitution of 1949.  The amendments were 
adopted by the last Communist Parliament in October 1989 and, in fact, the general 
institutional adaptation was made before the elections of 1990.   
The Hungarian Constitution sets the major frames of the civilian control exercised 
by parliamentary and executive bodies. According to the constitution, the President is the 
Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He appoints and promotes the general officers 
as proposed by the Minister of Defense.76  
The Parliament has the power to  
– decide on the declaration of a state of war and on the conclusion of peace; 
– declare a state of national crisis and establish a National Defense Council, in 
the case of war or imminent danger of armed attack by a foreign power 
(danger of war); 
– decide on the use of the armed forces, both abroad and within the country; 77 
 
If the Parliament is obstructed in reaching decision, the President has “the right to 
declare a state of war, a state of national crisis and establish the National Defense Council 
or to declare a state of emergency.” 78  However, in order to prevent abuse of power, he 
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must act jointly with the Speaker of the Parliament, the President of the Constitutional 
court and the Prime Minister.  Such an action must be reviewed by the Parliament as soon 
as possible and two-thirds majority is required for endorsement. Decisions taken by the 
President but not endorsed by the Parliament or the Defense Committee expire after 30 
days.  The Parliament or the Parliamentary Defense Committee may also suspend decrees 
and rules of the President.79 
The National Defense Council acts in the event of national crisis and has the 
power to “decide on the use of the armed forces abroad and within the country, and on 
the introduction of emergency measures…”80 The council is chaired by the President and 
is composed of “the Speaker of the Parliament, the floor leaders of the political parties 
represented in the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the Commanding 
Officer and the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army.”81  
All the arrangements above show that the Constitution contains all necessary 
preconditions to ensure the democratic control of the armed forces in various states of 
emergency and in war.  
The Constitution stipulates that in peacetime the government “directs the 
operation of the armed forces and the police and other security organs” and article 40A 
clearly defines the roles of the different enforcement agencies: 
– The fundamental duty of the armed forces (Hungarian Army, Border Guard) is 
the military defense of the country. As part of security activities, the Border 
guard shall guard the borders of the country, monitor and control border 
traffic, and maintain order on the borders. 
– The fundamental duty of the police is to maintain public safety and domestic 
order.82   
Day-to-day parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is exercised by a standing 
Parliamentary Defense Committee. Usually all of the parties present in Parliament have 
representation in the Committee. “The Committee oversees the implementation of the 
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tasks of Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), the levels of preparedness, and the state of 
equipment as well as the utilization of the resources.”83 In doing so the Committee has 
right to obtain all the necessary information and to conduct hearings the Minister of 
Defense, the Prime Minister, the commanding staff of the HDF and the Border Guard or 
witnesses. It also conducts interviews with the appointees for the Commander of the HDF 
and the Chief of the Staff of the HDF, the Commander of the Border Guard, the Deputy 
State Secretaries and Defense Attaches, and may only give recommendations for their 
appropriateness for these posts.84 “The Chairman of the Committee has permanent 
invitation to attend the meetings of the MoD Collegium (the highest MoD committee) as 
an observer, which enables him to keep up-to-date on all defense matters.”85 
From government’s side, the Minister of Defense is responsible for executing an 
effective oversight of the HDF. He has overall responsibility for the HDF and 
countersigns the Defense Plan. He approves the command structure and operating 
procedures of the HDF, directs the procurement of military equipment and war materials. 
He determines the principles of human resources’ management, directs the educational 
military institutes and appoints military attaches.86  
Another important actor in exercising the democratic control of the armed forces 
appears to be the Constitutional Court. The division of powers in the democratic 
countries allows the judicial authorities to act independently from the legislature and the 
executives. The practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court during the last fourteen 
years (the court was established in 1990) has proven that this democratic principle is 
inviolable in Hungary. The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of the laws 
and can annul laws or statutes that they are found to be unconstitutional. The Court 
accepts any appeal and it does not give favor neither to the armed forces nor to the other 
institutions in relation to the Constitution. In 1991 the Constitutional court played its first 
important role referring the civil-military relations. The court settled a dispute between 
the president and the government, which emerged from the ambiguity of the 
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constitution’s texts about the right to direct the armed forces. The court decided day-to-
day direction of the armed forces to be carried out by the government, but in war and 
emergency situations – by the President.87  
Implementing the policy, drawn at the Round Table, Hungary reached very fast a 
consolidation of democracy and established democratic working institutions. The 
elaborated constitution gave basis for the establishment of democratic control of the 
armed forces, assigning all the state institutions with proper responsibilities and powers.  
 
E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES  
 
The adoption of a democratic Constitution is, by itself, a very important phase of 
the establishment of democratic civil-military relations. However, civil-military relations 
are a very wide area of interactions among society, military and political elite. Therefore 
all aspects of this interaction should be precisely regulated. The dynamics of the social 
processes may also influence these relationships, and institutional arrangements and 
adaptation of the legal basis are necessary. All democratic Hungarian governments tried 
to develop democratic control of the armed forces through improvement of the 
institutional arrangements. 
 
1. Two Steps Ahead… (1990-1994) 
In 1990, before the first free elections, the reform of the Hungarian armed forces 
started exactly in the same way as the amendment of the Constitution had started. The 
1977 defense law was amended and the last government of the HSWP on December 1, 
1989 introduced the defense reform. The political nature of this reform caused later a lot 
of problems in the civil military relations. The HSWP government divided the Defense 
Ministry into two separate entities – a defense ministry subordinated to the Prime 
Minister and a Commander of the Hungarian Army subordinated to the President. This 
separation shielded the General Staff from governmental oversight. Predicting its loss of 
the free elections in the spring of 1990, by this division the communist government aimed 
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to prevent power institution such as HDF fall under the control of the opposition. At the 
same time, HSWP expectations were that the reformist communist leader Imre Pozsgay 
would be elected as a president in future general elections and the armed forces would be 
under his command. These initial plans were spoiled by the coalition formed by the two 
largest parties in the parliament after the elections – the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD). The deal was that MDF leader Jozsef 
Antall would head the government and AFD leader – Arpad Goncz would be elected a 
President by the parliamentary, but not popular, vote. The first civilian Defense Minister 
in the post-communist countries was Lajos Fur from MDF. He took office on May 23, 
1990.88  
The December 1989 defense reform broke the chain of command and the results 
appeared very soon. In October 1990 Hungary was in a constitutional crisis. Being from 
different political parties, the President Goncz and the Prime Minister Antall had 
different opinions about the proper use of the armed forces to end a transport strike in 
Budapest.89 While the government considered on using military vehicles to end the 
transport blockade, the president opposed it. The dispute “Who has the right to direct the 
armed forces?” was presented by the Prime Minister in the Constitutional Court. In 
September 1991 it announced its decision that “direction of the functioning of the armed 
forces is in legal power of the government” and also “Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces…is leading [the armed forces] though not commanding them.”90 The judiciary 
solved a dispute among the representatives of executive power, caused by a controversy 
of the legislative document. The division of powers proved to work as in a consolidated 
democracy. The decision favored the government and restored the broken chain of 
command. The Ministry of Defense is the closest governmental institution to the armed 
forces and has the potentials to exercise the day-to-day democratic civilian control, from 
which stems its importance.  
The decision of the Constitutional Court gave a green light to the government to 
start reforming the Ministry of Defense in order to redress the problems created by the 
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defense reform in 1989. The 1992 reform included restructuring and expanding the size 
of the defense ministry and civilianizing it. By March 1993, all three civilian top posts 
were in civilian hands. Civilianization was made not only for the leading staff of the 
ministry, but also at all levels replacing carrier military officers mostly with MDF 
supporters in order to strengthen the party control of the ministry.91 Since the new staff 
was without enough knowledge and experience in military matters, this left doubt of 
establishing a new form of political influence in the Ministry of Defense.92  
The direct subordination of the newly created Military Intelligence Office and the 
Military Security Office to the Minister of Defense is considered to be an improvement of 
the democratic control of the military.93  
In seeking solutions for the 1989 defense reform problems, in order to clear the 
chain of command, Defense Minister Fur suggested and the Constitutional Court 
approved his request for structural changes by granting authority to “fuse the Commander 
of the Hungarian Army position with the Chief of General Staff without constitutional 
amendment.”94 Fur submitted two laws. The first law provided new power to the 
executives: In three limited cases (invasion of Hungarian airspace, surprise air attack, or 
surprise invasion) the government could order immediate military action for not more 
than two Army brigades (5,000 troops), without the agreement of the President and 
without the declaration of emergency by the Parliament. The government however was 
obliged to inform the Parliament of any of such decisions. This step made government’s 
actions more flexible. The second law placed the Border Guard under the command of 
the Ministry of Interior in peacetime and under the Ministry of Defense command in case 
of war.95  
Antall’s government worked more actively in developing defense legislation. In 
April 1993 the Parliament adopted “Basic Principles of National Defense of the Republic 
                                                 
91 Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations, 17. 
92 Jeffrey Simon, “Expansion – Hungary”, available http://www.nato.cz/english/rozsir/hungary.html, accessed 
January 9, 2004. 
93 Zoltan Szenes, “The implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in Hungary”, in David Betz 
and John Lowenhardt, Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2001), 79. 
94 Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations, 19. 
95 Ibid., 20. 
34 
of Hungary” or simply “Defense Concept”. The Defense Concept followed the adopted 
by the Parliament “National Security Principles” and “Security Policy Concept.”96  
The Defense Concept states that the Hungarian Armed Forces have exclusively 
defensive functions. It elaborates the different sources of potential military threat and 
defines “the priorities of the strategy and system of national defense.”97 Eventual 
membership in NATO and Western European Union are seen as milestones for 
Hungary’s security. Assuming that this membership might be a long process, at first 
security will be strengthened by “closer relations with these institutions and their 
individual member states, as well as with the neighboring states in the region. Such 
cooperation will enable Hungary to adapt better to the international standards of the 
developed armies, in every field.”98  
The Defense Concept was followed by the adoption of the Defense Act on 
December 7, 1993. It covers almost all the aspects of the civilian control over the military 
and it further develops the Constitutional Court’s decision about the subordination of the 
armed forces to the government. It also stipulates “a complex system of checks and 
balances whereby the Cabinet, Parliament and the President of the Republic all 
individually have a say in matters of defense policy.”99  
In the time of its mandate 1990-1994, MDF-AFD government did a lot to solve 
the problems inherited from the last Communist Cabinet and to develop a good system of 
democratic control over the armed forces. With the last step it aimed to repair the 
uncertainties related to the democratization of the civil-military relations and approved its 
decision in January 1994 to merge the Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the 
Army Command. According to Minister Fur from March 1, 1994 the Ministry of Defense 
“would have three state secretaries: political, administrative and Chief of General 
Staff.”100 The integration of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff would place 
“armed forces under civilian control in peacetime and war.”101   
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 2. …and a Step Back (1994-1998) 
The 1994 elections brought to power the Hungarian Socialist Party, which formed 
a government with AFD. One of the first decisions of the new Defense Minister Gyorgi 
Keleti, a retired colonel and a former spokesman of the ministry, was “not to merge the 
defense ministry and army headquarters” and to separate again the positions of the Chief 
of Staff and the Commander of HDF. This decision, as well as the replacement of the 
MDF civilians with retired or acting military; the reorganization of the defense ministry 
and the reduction of its staff; the provision of the GS with more authority in military 
planning, including intelligence, raised questions about the effectiveness of the civilian 
control exercised by the Ministry of Defense during HSP-AFD government.102   
Motivated by the severe budget constraints and the necessity to reach 
interoperability with NATO, broad plans for long and midterm reorganization of military 
forces were announced in 1995. The command structure was reorganized in the period 
from 1995 to 1998: a decision for establishing a recruiting contract soldiers was taken, 
and the personnel were seriously cut.103 The civilian personnel were reduced by 69 
percent, the professional military officers – by 37.5 percent and the conscripts by 13 
percent. The NCO’s were increased from 9,700 to 10,800. In this respect: 
…the four-year Keleti era would be distinguished by significant 
demobilization of the civilian defense employees and professional officer 
corps.104 
In relation to improving accountability of the democratically elected institutions 
and respecting human rights, in 1995, the Parliament established two new institutions – 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the State Audit Office which 
were very useful for exercising democratic control over the armed forces too.105  The 
Ombudsman has the power to investigate abuses of the human rights and liberties of 
soldiers, as they are citizens in uniform.  As a result of its activity, the living conditions 
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have improved and the human rights in the armed forces are defended. The State Audit 
Office controls the economics of the defense forces; monitors spending in the defense 
budget; and reports directly to the Parliament. The Government Supervision Office also 
conducts investigations of the economic and financial activities of the militaries on 
governmental level and by Defense Budget Supervision Office in the Ministry of 
Defense.106  These structures are of great importance for the exercising of democratic 
control over the armed forces. 
One of the challenges the HSP-AFD government faced was to prepare the public 
opinion for joining NATO. Although almost all of the efforts of Horn government were 
directed towards consolidating Hungary’s difficult macro-economic situation,107 
assuming that invitation to join the Alliance may come earlier, it had done a lot to 
improve people’s attitude toward NATO. “While most of the Hungarians (85%) expected 
that joining NATO would increase the amount needed for defense, a majority (58%) 
opposed such increase.”108 To overcome such a controversy government carried out an 
outstanding campaign and in the vote in November 1997 85 percent of those who voted 
(50 % turnout) endorsed accession to NATO.109 
 
3. Newly in NATO (1998-2002) 
By 1998 two democratic coalition governments with different political affiliations 
took office after the first free elections. In terms of exercising democratic control of the 
armed forces, every one of them had its peculiarities, its good and bad sides. 1998 
Parliamentary elections brought to power a new three-party center-right coalition – 
Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP), Independent 
Smallholders and Citizens Party (FKGP) and Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Its 
mandate was marked by the preparation for NATO accession, joining NATO, 
participation in the war in Kosovo, and merging the Ministry of Defense and the General 
 two new institutions for democratic control of the military Staff of HDF. During that time
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were established – the National Security Cabinet (NSC) and the Secretariat for Foreign 
and Defense Policy. “The NSC consists of the foreign, defense, interior, finance, justice, 
and national security ministers, plus the chief of defense and is led by the prime 
minister.”110 It is an advisory and decision-making body which played a decisive role in 
defense-related issues and in cases of natural disasters. “The Foreign and Defense Policy 
Secretariat, which is headed by a political state secretary in the prime minister’s office, 
monitors the policies and activities of all the security-related ministries and supports the 
work of the NSC.”111 
The tasks related to NATO accession showed to the third democratic government 
that the deficiencies in the defense-related issues were more than they had been expected. 
The reforms made during the last ten years did not solve the problems regarding 
equipment, organizational structure, personnel and the system of logistics. By March 12, 
1999, the date of accession in NATO, Hungary met only 60 percent of its agreed 
commitment.112 The necessity of a more substantive reform was evident. They were 
proved not only theoretically – by RAND and Cubic assessments, but also practically – 
the war in Kosovo outlined the problems in military capabilities, and revealed the 
difficulties in co-operating with NATO allied forces.113 Struggling to prepare the first 
defense plan as a NATO member in 1999, the government was constrained not only by 
the finance shortages, but also by the lack of technological equipment to meet the new 
tasks. On July 21, 1999, looking for answers, the government ordered the Minister of 
Defense to conduct a Strategic Defense Review with the purpose of creating a “modern, 
NATO-compatible, flexible and sustainable defense force.”114 It should be based on the 
evaluation of the changed perception of security and the new Strategic Concept of 
NATO, which highlighted the new threats and respective capabilities of the forces, the  
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government decided to concentrate on “improving the functional characteristic of the 
armed forces, in terms of their readiness, deployability, sustainability, survivability and 
training.”115 
The review aimed also at improving the democratization of the civil-military 
relations. Deciding on defense matters such as restructuring, size and composition of the 
armed forces, “the new thinking” was that all government should be involved, not only 
the Ministry of Defense.116  
Reviewing in three months all the activities in the sphere of defense, it became 
clear that there were problems with the structure and size of the forces. There were also 
problems both with the personnel (poor living conditions for the conscripts in the 
barracks and inverted pyramid of command staff – more colonels and lieutenant colonels 
than junior officers), and with the defense planning (some planes were sold one year after 
being purchased or totally repaired).  
During the review the government suggested withdrawing of the Military Security 
Office and the Military Intelligence Office and merging them with the civilian secret 
services under the command of the respective minister. This move was explained as a 
way to reduce the military personnel, but the Parliamentary Defense Committee resisted 
this restructuring since merging all security services under the command of one 
institution posed a possibility for abuse of power.117 This decision of the Defense 
Committee shows its understanding and respecting of the principles of the democratic 
control.  
Based on the final evaluation of the Strategic Defense Review, the government 
defined major principles for the defense reform: increase of the defense budget and 
improvement of the efficiency of the defense expenditure; reduction of the size of the 
defense force from 61,000 to 45,000; modernization of the defense forces; introduction of 
long-term technical and infrastructure developments; and implementation of radical 
policy changes, especially in the area of force operations.118 
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After the Strategic Defense Review approval on March 16, 2000 the government 
prepared and the Parliament adopted the Long Term Restructuring Plan of the Hungarian 
Defense Forces.119 It envisaged cut of 16,000 personnel by: closure of 25-30 bases; 
abandonment of the underutilized barracks and concentration of the military units in 
common garrisons, hence deactivation of about 40 garrisons; turning many non-military 
activities – cultural, social, recreation and medical to civilian firms.  
One of the important tasks, which contributed to the improvement of the 
democratic control of the military, was integration of the Ministry of Defense and the 
Defense Staff. Separation of structures means duplication of bureaucracies and precludes 
full ministerial accountability. It was an embarrassing situation when “two separate 
Hungarian military delegations – one from the MoD and one from the HDF command – 
each with the same purpose, visited Sweden at the same time, unbeknown of each 
other.”120  Although all politicians and militaries as a first priority task acknowledged the 
establishment of an integrated ministry of defense, the civil-military tensions delayed its 
implementation. Political tensions between the government and the president also existed 
because of the unclear chain of command and added flavor in that situation. General 
Ferenc Vegh, who occupied the dual position of Commander of HDF and Chief of the 
General Staff, was subordinated to the President as a Commander of HDF and to the 
Minister of Defense as a Chief of the General Staff. The Strategic Defense Review 
eliminated the position of Commander of the Hungarian army and in the course of events 
General Ferenc Vegh resigned. 121 After years of preparation and talks and with all 
institutions involved in the civilian control (the Parliament, the President, the government 
and the Ministry of Defense), the General Staff was integrated into the Ministry of 
Defense on September 1, 2001.  This structure reduces duplication, costs less, and 
ensures a prompt decision-making and execution of orders, as well as efficient 
implementation of the budget.  The integrated ministry of defense relies on teamwork and 
a balanced mix of civil and military expertise and ensures that objective advice is 
provided to the Minister and government on defence issues. It also ensures that 
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governmental policy, regulations and guidelines are followed by the Armed Forces and, 
last but not least, ensures as well that there is a NATO-compatible defence structure in 
Hungary.122  
The basic function of the newly established Ministry of Defense is 
to provide for the flawless and efficient administrative powers of the 
Minister of Defense. The Constitution and the legislation was amended to 
this end and ruled to: 
– abolish the position of the commander of the Hungarian defense 
Forces; 
– to give the power of general command and control to the Minister of 
Defense over the defense forces; 
– the Administrative State Secretary of the MoD and the Chief of the 
Defense staff enjoy the same legislative status – within the structure of 
the Ministry – and there are laws to regulate their scope of activity and 
authority; 
– the Administrative State Secretary, who is the executive leading the 
administration of the MoD, also has the authority over the non-military 
activities of the HDF; 
– The Chief of the Defense Staff exercises power over the Hungarian 
defense Forces with delegated authority, being the number one soldier, 
the command authority and member of the Defense Council with a 
conference right;123 
 
4. The New Approach of the Hungarian Socialist Party (2002) 
After the elections of 2002, the Hungarian Socialist Party returned again to power 
in coalition with AFD. The Prime Minister Medgyessy appointed as a Minister of 
Defense Ferenc Juhasz. Except for the former defense minister Keleti, Juhasz was the 
only civilian minister who had some prior experience in defense matters. He had been 
member of the Parliament Defense Committee for two mandates, beginning from 1994. 
On May 14th, 1996 he was elected Vice-Chairman of the Defense Committee till the end 
of the mandate and during the next mandate (1998-2002) he was Vice-Chairman of the 
Defense Committee and Chairman of the Control Commission of the Defense 
Committee.124 The defense minister Junasz appointed as Political State Secretary Imre 
 the Parliamentary Defense Committee as Administrative Ivancsik, a former member of                                                 
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124 CV of Ferenc Juhasz available http://www.honvedelem.hu, accessed on January 15, 2004. 
41 
State Secretary Joszef Feher, who occupied that post during previous HSP-AFD 
government (1994-1998). He kept most of the leading staff of the Ministry of Defense 
and some of the newly appointed had experience in the defense area. All these 
circumstances show that Hungarian politicians had taken in account last mistakes and by 
appointing more experienced staff established a basis for steady civil-military relations. 
Having in mind the new organization and staff of the defense ministry, Juhasz’s 
ambitions for overcoming the lag in fulfillment Hungary’s commitment to NATO is 
justified. In July 2002 Juhasz ordered conducting the new defense review with the 
objective: 
…to redefine the function and tasks of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces in compliance with the significantly changed international situation 
and NATO concepts as well as the national interests and goals, identify 
and prioritise the necessary capabilities and make proposals to allocate 
resources to such capabilities.125 
 
The Defense Review considered the findings of the review, conducted in 1999-
2000, but could only integrate them to a smaller extent, since Hungary’s strategic status 
had significantly changed in those three years, partly due to the events of September 11, 
2001, and partly because seven more countries – including three of Hungary’s neighbors 
– were invited to join NATO in 2002.126 It respects Hungarian commitment to NATO 
and other international organizations and defines the parameters of the new forces 
according to the tasks. Further structural and numerical changes were planned to meet the 
“ambition levels”127 for territorial defense and for Article 5 or international operations 
forces and are strictly related to the budget allocations. In line with the ambition levels 
defined, a new bottom-up system of resource planning was developed, which allowed 
possibilities of reallocating resources to be reviewed. This way of conducting of the 
Defense Review showed the implementation of the scientific approach in defining the 
roles and missions of the armed forces. It presented a fundamental improvement in the 
thinking of the civilian and military leadership and, hence, it was an example of maturity 
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of civil-military relations in Hungary because linked available resources with the desired 
capabilities. As Paul Shemella said: “Without a set of roles that can be fully funded, 
military forces will never be capable of conducting successful mission.”128  
The plans for reforms provide Hungarian Defense Forces to be fully 
professionalized in three stages (by 2006), to be diminished to 30,000, and to be 
modernized till 2013. Short-term plans envisage timely and fully preparation of 
designated for NATO forces. 
All in all, the objective is to have nine NATO compatible, trained 
and fully manned battalions by 2006, which are provided with modern 
equipments and can be flexibly deployed.129 
The plans for reformation of the armed forces included changes in the proportions 
of officers’ structure. The number of NCOs was to be increased, which increased more 
the importance of the problem of their retention and recruitment. The same problem 
referred also to all of the officers. Therefore, being aware of these problems, the last two 
governments tried to address them. Within the budget availability, they tried to increase 
the officers’ prestige, to enhance the quality of their training, to increase officers’ income, 
and to develop attractive career paths. After the Defense Review from 2002/2003 
Minister Junsz stated: 
Qualitative reinforcement of the personnel and their retention 
requires the introduction of an incentive and salary system of such, which 
will be able to attract the military profession in the prospectively changing 
labour market situation even after joining the European Union.130 
According to the plans for the years before 2004, the ratio of the personnel is 
shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Ratio of Personnel Characterizing the Voluntary Forces  
(From Ferenc Juhasz, “Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century”) 
 
Officers  11-14% 
NCO 33-38% 
Contract soldiers 33-45% 
Public servants/civil servants 11-15% 
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5. Particularities of the Parliamentarian Oversight in Hungary 
Empowered by the Constitution, the Hungarian Parliament has been the main 
decision-making institution in defense area after 1989.  
The classical functions of civilian control of the armed forces, such 
as the definition of the structure, size, and budget of the armed forces, the 
development of the command and control system, the preparation of the 
defense act, and the service law were placed under the authority of 
parliament and have been undertaken reasonably.131  
In many cases Parliamentary oversight is deteriorated. For instance, during the 
socialist-liberal government it was hampered by the insufficient information from the 
Ministry of Defense. Minister Keleti’s actions are an indicative example. In 1996 he 
signed a contract for the acquisition of T-72 tanks from Belarus and decided on 
deployment of eight planes MiG-29 to NATO-PfP exercise in Poland without the 
approval of the Parliament.  Then the problems of defense oversight were acknowledged 
and the establishment of a budget planning system, a military defense planning system 
and legal regulations were discussed.132   
Such problems as lack of experience and absence of professional support staff or 
advisors on military matters also deteriorated the work of the Parliamentary Defense 
Committee.133 Jeffrey Simon’s assessment about Hungary’s parliamentarian control in 
HSP-AFD 1994-98 government covers all the governments in many aspects: 
Although the Defense and Security committee’s oversight of the 
defense budget still remained limited, it was one of the more effective 
Central European parliamentary defense committees, comprising five 
subcommittees with varying degree of activity and effectiveness.134 
Pal Dunay sees another impediment in exercising an effective civilian control by 
the Parliament. It comes as a result of the close party or coalition affiliation of the 
leadership of the Parliamentarian Defense Committee and the Minister of Defense.  
Between 1990 and 1998 the chairmen of the Defense Committee of 
the Parliament came from different parties of the governing coalition. 
Since the Orban government came to power in 1998, both the Defense 
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Minister and the Chairman of the parliamentary Defense Committee have 
come from Smallholders’ Party, further constraining the likelihood of 
criticism of the Defense Ministry by the Defense Committee.135 
 
F. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
 
Hungary was the most stubborn member of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 
which insisted on its dissolution and withdrawal of the Soviet troops from its territory 
even before the disbanding of the treaty. It was adamant in the discussions for the new 
bilateral agreement in 1991 when the Soviet Union insisted that Budapest accept “special 
clause prohibiting Hungary from joining any security alliance that Moscow deems hostile 
to its security interests.”136 Budapest consistently rejected the security clause as 
“incompatible with Hungarian raison d’etat”, because it would undermine Hungary’s 
national security policy and give the Soviet Union the power for veto. These examples 
are very indicative for the interrelation between Hungary and Soviet Union, latter Russia. 
They also unequivocally show Hungary’s alienation from Russian sphere of influence in 
early 1990s.  
Hungarian policy after 1989 undoubtedly has been streamlined explicitly towards 
integration in Western European institutions, “with an eye to a future pan-European 
integration, as the best solution to its security needs.”137 Hungary was very consistent in 
pursuing that aim. Therefore it is clear that the Western influence in Hungary’s 
democratization process was huge. Both NATO and European Union defined that one of 
the conditions for membership is a democratic relationship between the civil and military 
authorities within any applicant state. Hence the pressure on the countries, which wanted 
to join these structures, was directed to reformation of their civil-military relations. 
Relationship with NATO was important for the development of the democratic 
control of the military. The Alliance supported the democratic transition declaring an  
interest in the building partnership with all European nations in London in July 1990. 
After that the North Atlantic Co-operation Council was established in 1991 and the 
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Alliance offered more close contacts to partnership countries. When in January 1994 the 
Partnership for Peace Initiative was launched, it clearly stated that co-operation followed 
also the objectives of:  
– facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
process; 
– ensuring [a] democratic control of defense forces.138 
Hungary was among the first states that joined PfP and which offered a closer, 
more concrete and more intensive co-operation with NATO. Hungary, like other partner 
states, participated in political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and in the 
newly established Partnership Coordination Cell.  
When it became clear that NATO was really thinking of enlargement and 
democratic control of the military was among the most important criteria and it was 
accepted as a “dangled carrot.”139 Nevertheless democratic institutions in Hungary were 
established before 1994, NATO helped pushing the reforms further towards 
democratization of the civil-military relations.  
Hungary needed many types of assistance, when the country and 
its leaders, many of them without any previous political experience, were 
facing enormous political, economic, social and security-related 
difficulties.140 
The so-called “dangled carrot” was the reason Minister of Defense Keleti to 
recognize that the structural changes in the MOD-GS structures were inevitable. The 
Minister of Defense decided to deal with the integration of the MOD and the General 
Staff only after NATO countries’ experts declared the necessity of it. The most decisive 
pressure on the MOD was brought about by a British study (March 1996). Experts from 
the British Defense Ministry carried out a screening research on the Hungarian civilian 
control over the military. According to one of the most important conclusions of the 
study, the separate structure of the MOD and the GS constituted the most acute problem, 
putting an obstacle to the establishment of civil control.141 
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At the same time, NATO countries provided bilateral assistance to Hungary. For 
example, the United States and Germany opened their military schools for Hungarian 
officers and generals. The result was a newly educated military elite, which understood 
the rules of the democratic civil-military relations. Furthermore, NATO experts were 
closely involved in domestic debates on the democratization of the civil-military 
relations. Daily contacts between the Hungarian armed forces and NATO countries were 
set up. Additionally NATO experts were assigned to the MOD and to the national 
military institutions in order to aid the development of democratic-related knowledge, 
and to work out a more institutional cooperation in civil-military relations.142 
Providing different forms of education and training, the Alliance and its members 
focused directly on the programs form democratic civil-military relations. The 
involvement of military and civilian personnel from the Ministry of Defense and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed that this knowledge to be disseminated. Although 
there were concerns that “mainly senior military people were involved in these programs 
as part of their ‘re-education’”, training of a certain number of military officers 
contributed “to transfer the democratic approach to civil-military relations to the General 
Staff, the MoD, and the national military educational system.”143  
Partnership education programs broadened the discussion on civil-military issues. 
The program included not only the education abroad, but also the NATO-financed 
programs in Hungary. The results of this education were respectful and Ferenc Molnar 
wrote: “Since the domestic intellectual conditions concerning civil-military relations have 
improved, Hungarian efforts in this field have become more successful as well.”144 He 
assessed NATO influence to Hungary as follows: 
In a wider sense, NATO-organized events (conferences, education, 
and exercises) have influenced indirectly the democratization of civil-
military relations as well. All common activities – first of all, the 
numerous PfP exercises involving thousands of soldiers in activities, 
which have fitted to NATO standards – have socialized the military and 
have promoted the internalization of democratic norms, behavior, and 
attitudes. This is especially true with regard to accepting the active  





presence of the media, the NGOs and the local authorities during military 
activities. None of these actors had been involved in military exercises 




In developing democratic civil-military relations Hungary is one of the most 
successful post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The general 
acceleration of the democratization process influenced the development of the democratic 
control of the armed forces. The change of the political control of the military from one-
party control to control by democratically elected authorities was smooth due to the way 
of transition to democracy and also to the historically-proved fact of the non-involvement 
of the Hungarian armed forces into politics. It proceeded without obstacles.  
In establishing the institutional frameworks of the democratic control, Hungary 
presented a political unity and started the reforms in its structures even before 
communism collapsed. The legal basis was developed and institutionalization of 
democratic control was done in the first years of the transition, but it was developed 
unanimously by all of the governments without any difference what political attitude they 
had. The established parliamentary oversight was one of the most effective among the 
post-communist countries in early 1990s. In addition the structures to enforce the 
democratic control exercised by the Parliament and the government as the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the State Audit Office, National Security Cabinet, etc. 
were established.  
One of the successes is the long pursued reforms for unification of the Ministry of 
Defense and the General Staff, which reduced the duplication of structures, improved the 
cycle of decision-making and the execution of orders, improved the implementation of 
the budget, and made it a NATO-compatible defense structure. 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court, affecting the way of exercising the 
democratic control of the armed forces, proved that Hungary respects the democratic 
principle of division of powers and the rule of law, which is a proof for the consolidation 
of democracy in early 1990s.  
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On the military side, the armed forces were significantly reformed to fit NATO 
requirements and the scarce defense budgets. Although the financial resources greatly 
constrained Hungary’s armed forces from restructuring, modernization, and PFP-exercise 
participation, the last two governments had a more scientific approach in defense 
planning and the plans for reforms are more realistic. 
In short, Hungary has done a lot during years following 1989 and it is one of the 
obvious examples for democratization of the civil-military relations among the post-
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY                 
RELATIONS IN BULGARIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 1989 regime changes in the communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe happened to be the most significant event after World War II. On November 10, 
1989 the transition began in Bulgaria with the dismissal of Todor Zhivkov as Secretary of 
Communist Party. Bulgarian people supported the course of democratization of the 
country. Unfortunately, on the way to this aim, several governments meandered and did 
not present any decisive reforms in the political, economic and defense area until 1997. 
NATO’s uncertainty, regarding Bulgaria’s democratic control of the armed forces and 
foreign policy meant that Bulgaria missed the opportunity to be invited to join in Madrid 
1997. The new political leadership (of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and the 
National Movement Simeon II (NMSII)) acknowledged the lessons learned from that 
failure and, declaring Bulgaria’s ambitions to join NATO and EU, exerted all efforts to 
accelerate democratization of civil-military relations after 1997. The results to date are so 
impressive that Bulgaria was invited to join NATO in the second round of NATO 
enlargement in Prague 2002.  
In this Chapter I will analyze the development of democratic civil-military 
relations in Bulgaria after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 and the factors 
which influenced it. 
 
B. HISTORICAL LEGACIES  
 
1. Pre-Communist Legacy 
The Bulgarian state was founded in 681 and has a very turbulent combat history. 
The founders were the nomadic tribe of Bulgarians that fused with the domestic Slav 
tribes. Situated at the intersection of several major trade routes, the lands that constitute 
modern Bulgaria were of interest to a number of nomadic tribes and to the great powers 
as Byzantium, Rus, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires at different ages. A 
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strong army was required to oppose all the adversaries. Perceived as the foundation of 
Bulgarian nationality and the means of unification of the nation, the army has always had 
high reputation among the population and the rulers. 146 
Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 ended with signing of the Treaty of San 
Stefano, liberated Bulgaria from Ottoman domination and restored its statehood. 
Unfortunately, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 divided Bulgaria into three different 
communities: Bulgaria, an independent state under Turkish suzerainty; Eastern Rumelia – 
an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire; and Macedonia and Eastern Thrace 
were left within the Ottoman boundaries. (See Appendix B) This way much of the 
population remained out of the national boundaries. Prince Alexander von Battenberg 
(1879-1886), a German noble, who was elected Prince of Bulgaria by the National 
Assembly, sought to encourage the sentiments of honor and national consciousness 
through establishment of an autonomous national army. The clauses of the Treaty of San 
Stefano and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 stipulated that the senior ranks of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces had to be filled by Russian officers, appointed by the Tsar of 
Russia. Therefore it was not clear whom these officers had to be loyal and accountable to 
–the Bulgarian Prince, Bulgarian Constitution or Russian Tsar. In attempt to inculcate a 
sense of a national honor and a way of gaining control over the army, the Prince, after 
respective decision of the National Assembly, dismissed all Russian junior officers and 
replaced them with Bulgarians. This proved to be a decisive move. In 1885 these patriotic 
Bulgarian officers would succeed in the reuniting of Bulgaria and Rumelia in southeast 
and in achieving the victory over Serbia to the west.147  
Through his efforts to establish an autonomous army, unify Bulgaria and repulse a 
Serbian invasion, Prince Alexander gained popularity and inspired popular beliefs that 
the state could exist on its own and not as a puppet. Alexander’s achievements, provoked 
the pro-Russian senior officers to stage a coup in 1886, shortly followed by a counter-
coup led by the Parliament’s Speaker Stefan Stambolov and some pro-nationalistic and 
West-oriented officers. Although this resulted in the abdication of the Prince, Bulgaria 
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was able to establish its own state policy. This also helped for the foundation of a really 
national army, because the Russian Tzar withdrew all Russian officers.148 
The idea of a national unity led Bulgaria to fight four wars at the beginning of 20th 
century. Bulgaria successfully fought the First Balkan War (1912) against Turkey to 
liberate Bulgarian population and to expand its territory and lost the Second Balkan War 
(1913) against Serbia and Greece because of their violation of the prewar agreements. 
This loss led Bulgaria to join Germany in the First World War in 1915 with the intention 
to repair the injustices from the previous wars. By the end of the WWI Bulgaria was 
compelled to sign the Treaty of Neuille-sur-Seine (November 1919), which led to a 
national catastrophe, the resignation of Tzar Ferdinand and the crowning of his son Boris 
III. The Treaty of Neuille-sur-Seine had profound consequences for the Bulgarian army. 
Having started the century with one of the best equipped and most 
disciplined armies in the Europe, Bulgaria found itself abolishing its 
military service.149 
The Treaty required that Bulgarian army was limited to 20,000 and forbade the 
conscript service. Many disappointed former officers became politically active in the 
Military League - a formidable and well-organized opposition faction in 1920s and 
1930s.150 What is more the “military establishment embraced a fascist ideology as a 
means of reinvigorating both its military potential and its role in Bulgarian society.”151 
Coupled with the economic difficulties that Bulgaria, as well as all Europe, experienced 
in late 1920s, it resulted in two coups during the period of 1923-1944. Although in 1936 
King Boris III dismantled the Military League, the regime still had fascist ambitions. 
Like Hungary, Bulgaria allied with Germany in World War II in order to repair the 
injustices from the Treaty of Neuille and like Hungary was defeated.  
The civil-military relations during the period from Bulgarian liberation to the end 
of World War II could be best described as absence of democratic control of the armed 
forces. Members of the military were the subject of strong political influence and some 
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more even active participants in domestic politics. The lack of democratic control did not 
affect their popularity with the population. Table 2 chronicles the coup d’etat during that 
period. 
 
Table 2. Coup D’etat in the History of the Third Bulgarian State 
(From Todor D. Tagarev, “The Role of Military Education in harmonizing 
Civil-Military Relations: The Bulgarian Case”) 
 
Coup Forces behind the Coup Result Relation to Monarchy 
June 27, 1881 Kniaz (Prince) Alexander 
I, General Ernrot 
(Russian), Conservative 
Party 
Abolition of the 
Constitution; Regime of 
extraordinary powers 




and officers   
Abdication of the kniaz 
(prince) 
The coup is against the 






and officers with the 
Speaker of the Parliament 
Stambolov as a leader 
The kniaz confirms his 
abdication; Establishment 
of Council of Regency 
Counter-coup in 
“defense” of the policy 
of Alexander I   
June 9, 1923 “Military Union” and 
pro-fascist organizations  
Overthrow of the 
legitimate government of 
Stamboliisky 
Supported by Tzar 
Boris III  
May 19, 1934 Political circle “Zveno”, 
“Military Union”  
Abolition of the 
Constitution; Dissolution 
of all political parties 
Against the Monarchy  
 
2. Communist Legacy 
The Yalta Agreement at the end of World War II brought a strong Soviet 
influence over Bulgaria and it is indisputable that it led to an abrupt change in the model 
of the civil-military relations.  
The Bulgarian communist regime instituted a system of civil-
military relations based on the Soviet model, entailing a strong civilian – 
but not democratic – control of the military.152  
In the following 45-year period, the Bulgarian Communist Party, influenced by 
the Soviet example, exercised effective political control over the Armed Forces. 
However, analogous to Hungary, the role of the direct ties between Bulgarian military 
and the Soviet General Staff was essential in decisions on doctrine, strategy, planning, 
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composition, deployment, education and training, etc. The military had the monopoly 
over the defense information and the word “transparency” was practically unknown. 
Civilian expertise on defense issues was virtually unattainable, and the citizenry did not 
play any significant role in the defense and national security decision-making. As in other 
communist countries, the armed forces were subordinated to the Communist Party,  
…professional military personnel were indoctrinated with the 
Marxist-Leninist dogma, and political loyalty was made a more important 
criterion than professional competence in the selection of new officers.153 
As a result about 80 percent of the officer corps became members of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party (BCP) by 1980s. Structures of the Main Political Department existed in 
all units of the armed forces. Through the “apparatus” of political officers, the communist 
party exercised both high level and in-place control over the military. 154  
However the politics of such close relations with Soviet Union in 1950s and 1960 
was not strongly supported by the population and the military, and in 1965 General Ivan 
Todorov – Gorunia led a coup attempt against the President, Todor Zhivkov. As a former 
participant in the antifascist guerilla war, he did not act against the Communist 
government, but with the aim to replace the President with a more nationalistic and less 
pro-Soviet one. Unfortunately this early attempt to get Bulgaria out of the Soviet orbit 
failed, because the plans were revealed and the participants captured and put in jail. 155  
From this summary of Bulgarian civil-military relations we see that the military 
intervention in the domestic politics was a prominent historical legacy of the communist 
and especially pre-communist period. The communist period was characterized by a 
strong political but non-democratic control of the military. The end of the Cold War and 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact made Bulgarian politicians consider national security 
more thoroughly and the decision to adopt the Western democratic values led to 
acceptance of the Western patterns of civil-military relations as well. It is apparent that 
neither the communist nor the pre-communist historical legacies have had major 
influence on the country’s post-communist civil-military relations.156  
                                                 
153 Laura Cleary, “Still the People’s Army? Armed Forces and Society in Bulgaria,” 6. 
154 Ibid., 6. 
155 Ibid., 6. 
156 Plamen Pantev, “The changing Nature of Civil-Military Relations in Post-Totalitarian Bulgaria,” 152. 
55 
C. PATH OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
 
Bulgaria was a pure example for an early post-totalitarian regime transition to 
democracy proceeded as a regime controlled transition.157 The political conditions in 
Bulgaria before 1988 “still approximated the totalitarian ideal type.”158 All political or 
citizens’ movements were blocked by the regime at their birth. For instance, a 1988-
protest movement against the pollution in the border town of Ruse caused by a Romanian 
chemical plant was gaining popularity, but the participants were strictly controlled by the 
regime. Members of the Central Committee, who attended the presentation of a film 
concerning pollution, were accused of creating political structures parallel to those 
existing. Commenting this case Linz and Stepan asserts:  
For us, this charge is virtually a definitional statement 
demonstrating that, in the arena of pluralism, Bulgaria in 1988 still 
approximated totalitarian regime.159 
The exercised firm control by the regime made the civil, and especially the 
political society, in Bulgaria to be weak and badly organized from the very beginning of 
the transition. Actually an opposition “actively emerged as an effective force in Bulgaria 
only by mid-1989.”160 Therefore the lack of substantial and active opposition could not 
lead to change of the system. The changes started with an internal party coup on 
November 10, 1989, when the Communist Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov was 
overthrown. The leaders of the changes, some more open-minded party leaders, could be 
perceived as reformers. They were in control of all of the changes and they directed 
development of the events. At the time the Bulgarian People’s Army took no action when 
Zhivkov was ousted and declared the intention to be an apolitical and stabilizing factor in 
the peaceful transition to democracy.161  
The regime controlled all arrangements, leading to the change of the system. The 
regime was in charge of the establishment of Round Table with the opposition. The 
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Communist Party leadership set it up in January 1990 before the newly emerged 
opposition strengthened and united. Unlike in Hungary, the opposition was not able to 
hold Opposition Round Table and define the common principles of negotiation, which 
weakened additionally its position. The Communist Party was able to set the agenda for 
the transition and to control the whole negotiation process. Consequently it is not 
amazing that the date for the first post-communist elections was set as early as June 1990, 
so the opposition to be impeded to prepare for them. Not like in Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, in Bulgaria the former Communist Party (which in March 1990 was 
renamed Bulgarian Socialist Party) won the first post-communist elections. The victory 
of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) “meant that the party controlled the parliament and 
the government and succeeded in reconstituting its rule on basis of participation in round 
table discussion and a popular mandate.”162 This gave opportunity to the old rulers to 
strengthen their power in the new conditions and launch a policy of penetration into the 
state’s economic and financial structures. In this way, the formation of a new oligarchy 
started.163 It was in practice the second power, which aimed at controlling of the political 
and social processes, and in a short period of time its influence became very perceptible, 
even, in some cases, it still can be found today.  
As it was decided at the Round Table talks, the elections were for a Great 
National Assembly – the constitutional parliament. Despite the fact that the opposition 
contested the moral legitimacy of the formal majority – that of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party – to adopt a democratic constitution and a lot of protest actions were held, the new 
Constitution was adopted on July 12, 1991. The Bulgarian Constitution was the first 
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D. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF 
THE ARMED FORCES 
 
As soon as the opposition was accepted as an actor on the political scene, the 
issue of depolitization of the armed forces was discussed. In this respect the reform wing 
of the Communist Party had taken decisive steps. In January 1990 they repealed the 
section of Article 1 of the Constitution that had institutionalized the exclusive political 
role of the party in the armed forces, they forbade the political organs in the Army and 
abolished the Main Political Department in the Defense Ministry. In October 1990 a law 
on political parties was approved, which depoliticized several government institutions, 
including the Army, and required they to report to the state rather than to the ruling party. 
By the end of the year, 98 percent of all military personnel reportedly had relinquished 
their membership in political parties in accordance with the law. If they refused to do so, 
they were discharged from service. What was more, in 1991 the Ministry of National 
Defense supported the idea for exclusion of active-duty military personnel from voting in 
elections.165  
Although moving toward depolitization of the armed forces, the real 
institutionalization of democratic control of the armed forces started with the introduction 
of the new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria in 1991. The Constitution proclaims 
the parliamentary form of government in Bulgaria and establishes the principle of 
division of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial powers. 166 
According to the constitutional arrangements, the main responsibility for the 
national security is shared by the National Assembly, the President (who is also Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces), and the Council of Ministers. 
The National Assembly is vested with the legislative authority and exercises the 
parliamentary control. The Constitution gives the National Assembly certain specific 
powers and functions with respect to the national security. The Parliament resolves on the 
ion of peace. The deployment and use of Bulgarian armed declaration of war and conclus                                                 
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forces outside the country’s borders, and the deployment of foreign troops on the territory 
of the country or their crossing of that territory have to be approved by the National 
Assembly. On a motion by the President or the Council of Ministers, the Parliament 
introduces a martial law or a state of emergency on all or part of the country’s territory. 
The National Assembly ratifies or denounces all international treaties and agreements 
which are of political or military nature, or concern Bulgaria’s participation in 
international organizations.167 
The National Assembly, assisted by the Parliamentary National Security 
Committee (since 2001 called Parliamentary Foreign Policy, Defense, and Security 
Committee), carries out the parliamentary control over the activities of the Ministry of 
Defense, and consequently – over the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF), Military 
Intelligence and Military Counter-Intelligence; over the Ministry of Interior and 
consequently – over the Border Forces, the Gendarmerie, and the National Security 
Service; as well as over the National Intelligence Service and National Protection 
Service, which are subordinated to the President.168 
The President is the Head of State and, according to Article 100 of the 
Constitution, he is vested with an important role in the national defense as a Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He appoints and dismisses the higher 
command of the armed forces and bestows all higher military ranks on a motion from the 
Council of Ministers. The President has the authority to proclaim general or partial 
mobilization on a motion by the Council of Ministers in accordance with the law, as well 
as to proclaim a state of war in case of an armed attack against Bulgaria or whenever an 
urgent action is required by virtue of an international commitment, or to proclaim a 
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session and cannot be convened. In the latter case, the National Assembly should be 
convened to endorse the decision.169 
The President presides over the Consultative National Security Council. A law 
establishes its status.170 
According to Article 105 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers directs the 
implementation of the state’s domestic and foreign policy, ensures the national security 
and exercises overall guidance over the state administration and the Armed Forces. 
Furthermore, the Council of Ministers is responsible for the management of the state 
budget and assets, and concludes, confirms or denounces international treaties when 
authorized to do so by law.171 
Although the Constitution sets up the basis of the democratic control of the armed 
forces, this control was refined later by the adoption of Law on Defense and Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria (LDAF) in 1995, the National Security Concept in 
1998, the Military Doctrine in 1999, other basic laws of the special intelligence means, 
and the Consultative Council of National Security. 
 
E. DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
OF ARMED FORCES 
 
1. Period of Political Instability (1990-1997) 
Very tempestuous political struggles and desperate attempts to overcome the 
economic crisis characterized the period of 1990-1997. Therefore the development of 
civil-military relations was not a top-priority issue on the agenda of all political parties. 
During that period six governments were changed, two parliaments were dissolved and 
extraordinary elections for new parliaments were held. People were disappointed and 
exhausted by this political activity, which did not lead to any improvement of the 
economic situation. If we consider the elections for parliament, president and local 
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authorities, it comes out that elections were held almost every year. In such conditions of 
change, continuity in policy was impossible.172  
In contrast to Hungary, in Bulgaria there were two main political forces – the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). During this 
period these parties won the elections and formed governments alone or in coalitions, 
which were dominated entirely by them. Although the Parliaments consisted usually of 
four or five parliamentary represented parties, conditions for wide coalitions as in 
Hungary were not present, because BSP or UDF possessed absolute or close to absolute 
majority.  
After the first post-totalitarian elections BSP won 53 percent of the votes and 211 
of 400 seats in the Great National Assembly.173 Then the first Socialist government with 
Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov was formed and this started the economic reforms in 
1990, but it lost support in the party and its electorate and it was compelled to resign in 
December 1990. This government was replaced by a coalition government formed by 
leading UDF and BSP politicians under the Premiership of Dimitar Popov, a non-partisan 
judge. Popov’s government freed the prices and allowed more private initiatives, giving 
the Great National Assembly the opportunity to produce and ratify a new Constitution by 
the summer of 1991.174  
The Great National Assembly was dissolved in August 1991 after completing its 
mission – to ratify the new Constitution. The centre-right UDF narrowly won the 
elections held in October 1991 – 42% of seats (against 40% for BSP), and formed a 
minority government together with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), 
which won 9% of the seats.175 That government, headed by the UDF’s leader Phillip 
Dimitrov, rapidly passed the legislation on the return of the nationalized lands and urban 
properties. This measure aimed to accelerate the development of the emerging private 
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sector. By the autumn of 1992 Bulgarian economy had largely overcome the after-shocks 
of its disintegration under Lukanov, but the defection of the MRF from the coalition, led 
to the fall of Dimitrov’s government. The new political configuration in the parliament 
managed to construct a non-partisan government headed by the economic historian, 
Professor Lyuben Berov, by December 1992.176  
Berov’s government claimed that it would follow the UDF’s own reform 
program, but as Berov relied on the BSP’s support in the parliament and the socialists 
were in not ready to embrace the fully-fledged capitalism – the reform was stopped rather 
than speeded up. Thus Berov’s government was given its nickname “the do-nothing 
government” and the public support for it was gradually withdrawn. 177   
 
Table 3. Prime Ministers and Governing Parties since 1990  
(After: Laura Cleary, “Coming in from the Cold: Bulgaria and NATO,” 
Cranfield University, The Royal Military College of Science, UK)   
 
Period in Office Prime Minister Governing Party Reason for Collapse
Feb. – Dec. 1990 Andrei Lukanov BSP Popular protests 
Dec. 1990 – Oct. 
1991 
Dimitar Popov Coalition 
Government 
The end of  the 
Parliamentary 
mandate 
Oct. 1991 – Dec. 
1992 
Filip Dimitrov Coalition of UDF 
and MRF 
Frictions within the 
coalition and lost vote 
of confidence  
Dec. 1992 – Oct. 
1994 
Lyuben Berov MRF Political crisis – after 
his resignation, 
impossible to 
establish a new 
government 
Oct. 1994 – Jan. 
1995 
Reneta Indzhova Interim government  
Jan. 1995 – Feb. 
1997  
Zhan Videnov BSP Popular protests led 
to political crisis 
Feb. – Apr. 1997 Stefan Sofianski Interim government  
Apr. 1997 – Jul. 
2001 
Ivan Kostov UDF The end of mandate 





                                                 
176 Evgenii Dainov and Vladimir Shopov, “The Democratic Process of Bulgaria”, 23. 
177 Ibid., 25. 
62 
 The public disappointment, result of the initial pro-market reforms, and the 
internal squabbles and fights in UDF led to December 1994 extraordinary elections won 
by BSP, which gained 125 of 240 seats in the Parliament, while UDF managed to win 
only 69 seats.178 Unfortunately the BSP’s new government led by Zhan Videnov stopped 
the privatization process and “explicitly announced its withdrawal from the consensus 
reached at the 1990 Round Table and declared that the consensus was a mistake.” All 
economic measures undertaken by the government were anti-market directed and by the 
end of 1996 Bulgaria was in state of an economic catastrophe: hyperinflation of about 
2000 percent in the period March 1996 – March 1997, endemic shortages, ruin of 
national currency and collapse of the bank system. Waves of popular protests and civil 
disobedience led to the fall of the government in February 1997. 179  
During this period of economic crisis, political disorientation and practical inertia 
in democratization of civil-military relations, two important laws were adopted.  Law for 
Consultative Council for National Security was adopted in February 1994, as prescribed 
by the Constitution, and Law of Defense and Armed Forces of Republic of Bulgaria 
(LDAF) in December 1995. The first law defines the structure and tasks of this 
consultative body chaired by the President. It consist of the Speaker of the Parliament, the 
Prime Minister, the ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finances, the 
Chief of the General Staff and representatives of each parliamentary group.180  
The second law – Law on Defense and Armed Forces further develops the 
institutional arrangements concerning the democratic control of the armed forces. It 
defines that the Parliament adopts the documents related to the national security, for 
example, the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, etc. on motions by the 
Council of Ministers. The President’s responsibilities and competencies, in cases of war 
and actual initiation of contingencies, are clarified.181  The Council of Ministers is 
                                                 
178 Information about parliamentary elections 1994 is available at http://www.izbori-bg.com, accessed February 
24, 2004. 
179 Evgenii Dainov and Vladimir Shopov, “The Democratic Process of Bulgaria”, 26. 
180 Law for Consultative Council for National Security, State Gazette #13 from February 11, 1994, available at 
http://www.president.bg, accessed January 12, 2004. 
181 Law on Defense and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria (LDAF), State Gazette #112 from December 
27, 1995, available http://www.md.government.bg, accessed January 24, 2004, Chapter 3, Section 3, Articles 27-30.  
63 
responsible for the directing and implementing the defense policy. The law stipulates that 
the Council of Ministers provides the general guidance of the Armed Forces as well as 
the direction on their structuring, preparation and logistic support, as well as combat and 
mobilization readiness. To this end, the Council of Ministers establishes the structure of 
the Bulgarian Armed Forces; adopts the plans for restructuring the armed forces; adopts 
the State Wartime Plan and the wartime budget; provides general guidance on 
mobilization of the Armed Forces and the transition of the country from peacetime to 
martial law and states of emergency.182  
As one of the most important figures that exercise the democratic control of 
armed forces, the Minister of Defense is defined as a civilian who is directly responsible 
for conducting the state policy in the Ministry of Defense and for the implementation of 
the civilian control over the armed forces. The Minister exercises his competencies by 
participating in the development of the National Security Concept; elaboration and 
implementation of defense budgets; directing the personnel policy (including the 
promotions of officers up to the rank of colonel); carrying out oversight of educational 
and R&D activities; and directing information and public relations policy. On his motion, 
the Council of Ministers adopts and presents to the President the high ranking officers to 
be appointed to the rank of general in the Bulgarian Armed Forces and the central 
administration of Ministry of Defense, including the Chief of the General Staff of the 
BAF. In his work the Minister of Defense is assisted by the Deputy Ministers and the 
Chief of the Political Cabinet, who are civilians, as well as by the Chief of the General 
Staff.183  
The Defense Council, under the authority of the Minister of Defense, is a 
consultative body, which assist him in decision-making process. It is composed of the 
Deputy Ministers, the Chief of the General Staff and his deputies, the Commanders of the 
services, the Chief Inspector and other officials appointed by the Minister of Defense.184 
In performing these supervisory functions, the Minister is supported by an 
Inspectorate, in which civilian and military staffs are included. The Inspectorate controls 
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the effective implementation of the budget and procurement policy, the observation of 
human rights, the personnel and recruitment policy, the social policy and protection of 
environment, the abuses of financial or military discipline, and others.185   
The Law on Defense and Armed Forces stipulates the responsibilities and powers 
of the Chief of the General Staff in peace and war, and thus defines the chain of 
command. He was conferred some important activities directly related to the formulation 
of security policy, including the responsibilities of organizing the elaboration of the draft 
of the Military Doctrine and its subsequent implementation, and conducting the work of 
military intelligence.186 As the adoption of the national security documents and the 
direction of the intelligence services should be under civilian control, the responsibilities 
of elaborating such kind of political documents and control of the intelligence services 
were transferred to the Ministry of Defense by the changes in the LDAF in 1997. 
LDAF guaranteed the independence of the military judiciary – courts, inquire, and 
procurators by subordinating them to the Ministry of Justice and respectively the General 
Procurator. As they are still military, the Minister of Defense is responsible only to accept 
or leave them in military service on proposal of the Supreme Judicial Council. The 
military judiciary treats the military servants in strictly defined cases. If the violation is of 
civic nature civilian courts should treat the militaries.187    
The detailed analysis of the legislative documents shows that they provide a solid 
base for the institutionalization of the democratic civilian control. The Constitution and 
the Law of Defense and Armed Forces clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the 
Parliament, the generally-elected President, the Council of Ministers, the civilian 
Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, and the judicial branch. Moreover, 
the comparative analysis made by Jeffrey Simon shows “that in the development of the 
normative base of civilian control Bulgaria is ahead of most countries in CEE, including 
the Visegrad countries.”188 
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The adoption of the legal basis was a good beginning for the formal establishment 
of democratic control of the armed forces but not the end, as many politicians, and 
especially the military, thought. The process of building organizational structures and 
developing procedures for civilian control were also to be done. The working patterns 
were more important in the evaluation of the institutional presentation of the democratic 
control of the military than the existence of formal legal basis.  
During that very unstable period of the modern Bulgarian political history, several 
events tested the public and politicians’ perception of democratic control of the military.  
The first example when it was respected was the untimely resignation of the President 
Petar Mladenov, former member of Politburo and initiator of the 1989 changes. In an 
unsuccessful attempt to quell the public demonstration in 1990 in front of the Parliament, 
he was recorded as saying “…it’s better for tanks to come…” This led to a wide-spread 
media scandal and Mladenov’s resigned from the post. The Great National Assembly 
then had elected the leader of the opposition UDF and former dissident Zhelyu Zhelev as 
president. Another indicative example is the dismissal of General Petrov as Chief of 
General Staff in 1994 because of public confrontations with the Minister of Defense on 
basis of different political affiliations.189 Although very fragile, first arrangements of the 
democratic control of armed forces were well accepted by politicians and military and 
had effect in first years of the transition.   
Very indicative of the military’s perception of democratic control was the refusal 
of Chief of General Staff General Totomirov to take part in quelling of street protests in 
January 1997. The then ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party several times attempted to 
involve the General Staff in case it need declare a civil emergency. The Chief of the 
General Staff unambiguously declared “that Bulgarian Army will by no means undertake 
any home political functions.”190 Thus involvement of the armed forces into domestic 
politics was avoided. 
The first UDF government in 1991 appointed the first civilian Minister of Defense 
Dimitar Ludzhev. He reorganized the Ministry of Defense, defined responsibilities of the 
military and civilians, and attempted to start defense reform, but because of 
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disagreements with Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov was compelled to resign.191 
Unfortunately his policy was not continued by his successor and when the socialist 
government of Zhan Videnov came to power, the issue of the reform faded entirely. The 
principle of civilian control of the military and the process of civilianization of the 
Ministry of Defense was dropped. BSP appointed as a Minister of Defense a retired 
Admiral, and as a Deputy Minister for military and political affairs - a retired Colonel. 
Many other lower positions were re-militarized too.192  
As in Hungary, the division of powers in Bulgaria during the period 1990-1997 
worked in accordance with the democratic practices. The Constitutional Court handed 
down the ruling in 1995, which “allowed the government to be the sole authority 
approving the deployment and use of Bulgarian armed forces outside the country’s 
borders for humanitarian, environmental, educational, sports and other missions of 
peaceful (non-military) nature.”193 Until then, according to Article 84 of the Constitution, 
all the activities related to dispatching of Bulgarian armed forces abroad or allowing 
foreign armed forces on Bulgarian ground was responsibility of the Parliament. When the 
Law of Defense and Armed Forces was amended in 1997, this ruling was introduced in it. 
The practices in Bulgaria during the period of 1990-1997 show that the civilian 
control of the armed forces exists, but it is hindered by many problems. One of the major 
peculiarities of civilian oversight was the lack of expertise. It was related first to the lack 
of previous education and experience of civilians in military matters and second to the 
very unstable political situation. Parliamentary and Council of Ministers’ members were 
changed very often and the possibility for establishment of the proper experience and 
continuation of the policy in security and defense area was absent. The same was true for 
the civilian experts in the Ministry of Defense. As Bonchev said, until 1998 the Ministry 
of Defense still remained a military-minded institution because: 
 
                                                 
191 Dimitar Dimitrov, “Military Reform and Budgeting for defense in Bulgaria (1989-2000)”, in David Betz and 
John Lowenhardt (editors), Army and State in Post-communist Europe, (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2001), 119. 
192 Plamen Bonchev, “Civil-Military Relations in the Process of Security and Defence Policy Formulation: A 
Case Study of Bulgaria’s Participation in PfP”. 
193 Ibid.. 
67 
…the civilian staffing has been based predominantly on [a] 
‘political appointees’ model. This has prevented the creation of a stable 
civilian core and has had negative effect on the accumulation and 
improvement of civilian expert knowledge.194  
 
The 1990-1997 period of development of democratic civil-military relations in 
Bulgaria was succinctly described by Jeffrey Simon as “7 lost years.”195 
 
2. On the Way Towards NATO (1997-2004) 
a. The New Political Situation  
 The held in April 1997 elections brought to power UDF with full majority 
in the Parliament – 137 of 240 MPs, and the government of Ivan Kostov was formed. The 
Government realized that the recovery from the grave crisis could be achieved only 
through a broad, nation-based consensus. In the Parliament, the MRF and the Euro-left 
supported the UDF.196 On May 8th, 1997 the Parliament unanimously signed the National 
Consensus Declaration. Imperative reforms in the financial, economic and political area 
and accession to the EU and to NATO were among the agreed seven points.197 The 
Declaration was unique in the recent Bulgarian history – for the first time political parties 
decided to work jointly for the Bulgarian revival rather than to pursue the party’s 
interests. This gave the UDF government a powerful leverage in introducing broader 
political and economic reforms. 
 Along with the economical revival, the efforts of the government were 
directed towards preparing Bulgaria for accession in EU and NATO.  
The integration agenda concentrates on domestic efforts, is aimed 
at reaching a level of development (political system, institution building, 
structural reform, economic growth, changing patterns, legislative 
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frameworks, interoperability of the Armed Forces and security structures 
etc.) corresponding to the requirements for membership.198 
 Right after Kostov’s government took office, it verified Bulgaria’s 
decision to join NATO, which was announced by the caretaker government in March 
1997. Decisive measures were undertaken to overcome the problems in the area of 
interoperability. It started with adjusting the legal basis for operation with NATO. In a 
short period of time the Law of Defense and Armed Forces was amended and some 
important defense policy documents, such as the National Security Concept and the 
Military Doctrine, were adopted. 
 Very substantial improvement in the democratic control of the armed 
forces was attained by changes in the legal code. LDAF was amended several times and 
the most significant changes were introduced in 1997 and 2000. The major changes 
concerned the responsibilities of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General 
Staff. The Minister of Defense was no longer responsible for the drawing of the National 
Security Concept, but was relegated to participate in its elaboration together with the 
other ministers. This amendment is indicative that the understanding of nature of the 
national security was changed and went beyond the armed forces.199  
 The Chief of the General Staff was deprived of the direct responsibility to 
propose to the Minister of Defense the Draft of the Military Doctrine. Since the Military 
Doctrine defines the structure of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and the personnel strength, 
it was against the principles of the democratic control such document to be prepared by 
the military.200  
 The advisory body of the Minister of Defense – the Defense Council – has 
the responsibilities for “consideration on topical issues of the defense policy; the military 
aspects of the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine; the defense budget; 
and other issues of Minister of Defense’s responsibility.”201 Together with the 
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improvement of the exercising of the democratic control, the work of the consultative 
body allows the utilization of a civilian and military expertise in the decision-making 
process in respect of the defense policy. 
 Other result of the amendments of the LDAF was the redistribution of the 
power between the Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. In 1997 the 
Military Counter-Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service were 
subordinated to the Minister of Defense.202 Thus an important civil-military relations 
issue – the control of the intelligence services – was solved in the proper way. The 
President directs the civilian intelligence service now and the Minister of Interior – the 
counterintelligence service. The division of the security and intelligence services and the 
responsibilities for the exercising of the civilian control over them allow establishment of 
conditions for misuse of these institutions to be prevented. On one side they are 
controlled by different civilian authorities, on other – the services may control each other.  
 
b. Adoption of National Security Concept and Military Doctrine 
 The issue of the development of a National Security Concept became 
important right after the changes in 1989, when Bulgaria regained its full sovereignty and 
independent foreign and defense policy. The elaboration of the Concept started in 1990 
when a working group was set. Several state institutions, academic centers and NGOs 
were actively involved in this process.203 Unfortunately the unstable political situation 
and the frequent changes of the governments till 1997 blocked the finalization of the 
document.  
 The decision to join NATO showed the pressing need of a national 
security strategy. Respecting the national interests, the document should be compatible to 
the maximum degree with “the philosophy and the fundamental principles of the Alliance 
Strategic Concept from 1991” and all contemporary NATO ruling documents as well as 
with the Common Concept of 28 WEU nations on European Security. In August 1997 a  
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working group, chaired by the Prime Minister, was established. The Draft of the National 
Security Concept was presented to the National Assembly and on April 16, 1998 it was 
approved. 204  
 The National Security Concept represents the formally adopted political 
views concerning the protection of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state against 
external and internal threats of any nature. The Concept has a clear defense meaning and 
claims that Republic of Bulgaria does not have any territorial claims and does not 
recognize such claims on its territory. It asserts that the process of integration into NATO 
and EU has a positive influence upon the security of Bulgaria. Joining the collective 
defense alliance is directed towards improvement of the national security and it is not 
directed against any country. 205  
 The Military Doctrine is developed on the basis of the National Security 
Concept and the Law on Defense and Armed Forces. The elaboration of the Military 
Doctrine in Bulgaria is an example of workable principle of democratic control of the 
armed forces. It was done through the close and fruitful cooperation between military and 
civilian experts and the implementation of a rational approach in defining the structure 
and size of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. It is also a demonstration that the democratic 
control of defense planning has reached a new and improved level.  
 The improvement of the civilian control of defense planning had an effect 
on the plans for the reforms of the armed forces. As the General Staff proposed it in 
1998, the government adopted the Plan for Reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces till 
2010 with a final number of 75,000 military personnel and substantial modernization and 
re-armament.206 The provisions of the plan showed an unrealistic assessment of the 
situation and it was pretty clear that the civilian contribution was not significant, if there 
was any. This confirmed the words of NATO advisor Chris Donnelly, who had said an 
year earlier: 
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…there is no Central and Eastern European country that has the 
effective army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of 
defence it requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its 
generals. 207 
 In addition, the impartial evaluation of Jeffrey Simon was that the 
Bulgarian government is “lacking an understanding of how far behind they are, as well as 
what they need to do, to seek integration.”208 This opinion was proved by a follow-up 
study, sponsored by the UK Ministry of Defense, which found that “there is lack of 
realism and coherence between budgets and defense planning.”209 The necessity for 
changes in the defense plans was obvious by the autumn of 1998 and the government 
asked the US government for support in the conducting of a comprehensive defense 
reform study.  
 The conducted study was equal to a strategic defense review. Nine teams 
were set. They included not only Bulgarian civilian and military experts, but also US 
experts, and they studied all services and branches. Evaluation of the results was made by 
a tenth Bulgarian team, led by a high ranking civilian. They looked for a model of 
Bulgarian Armed forces that best met the requirements of the national security and 
defense and is also capability based. Variants of peacetime strength were discussed in the 
Defense Council, attended by the President and the Prime Minister. Assessing the 
appropriateness of the variants to “interests, risks, scenarios, and resources, the Bulgarian 
state leaders decided to give their support to the 45,000-model of the armed forces.”210  
 Based on this elaborated proposal by the Minister of Defense, the Council 
of Ministers approved the draft of the Military Doctrine and sent it to the Parliament. The 
doctrine was adopted in April 1999 and became the basis for further reform of the armed 
forces. 
 As a document, the Bulgarian Military Doctrine is roughly equal to a 
National Military Strategy in the USA. It assesses the threats, risks, and challenges to the 
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national security. The evaluation for Bulgaria was that “Republic of Bulgaria does not 
face any immediate military threat.”211 It defines the roles, missions and tasks of the 
armed forces, the major parameters of the force structure, NATO and EU integration 
requirements, the principles of the Bulgarian participation in the PfP Program and peace-
support operations, etc.  
 The procedure of elaboration of such an important document, like the 
Military Doctrine, showed a new phase of exercising of democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces in Bulgaria. It also proved the maturity of the new civilian leadership, 
which had taken its decision according to the principles for efficient and effective defense 
management.  
 
c. Plan for Organizational Development of the Armed Forces 2004 
 Article 93 of the Military Doctrine prescribed that a Plan for 
Organizational Development of the Armed Forces till the end of 2004 (Plan 2004) should 
be developed. For the preparation of the plan the Minister of Defense issued “guidance 
on major organizations in the force structure, personnel limits and resource constraints, 
while leaving some flexibility to the military in devising the reform plan.”212 The 
Civilians became more and more confident of their authority to exercise democratic 
control of the military and successfully took part in the defense planning. In this sense, it 
is important not simply to guide the militaries, but also to be able to provide well-
grounded directions, based on solid civilian expertise in military matters.  
 In September 1999 the Council of Ministers adopted plans for 
organizational development of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense till 2004. In 
fact this was the beginning of the real defense reform in Bulgaria. The democratic control 
of the military attained a new, higher level of development. Assessing the work on Plan 
2004, Tagarev wrote that:  
Plan 2004, even if far from perfect, is widely acclaimed as a very 
significant step toward adapting the Bulgarian defense establishment to 
the Post-Cold War security environment. More importantly, the process of 
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elaboration and approval of Plan 2004 set a precedent for Bulgaria in 
which civilians and the military closely interact in defining objectives, 
conducting a study, assessing alternative force models, drafting 
recommendations and planning guidance, supervising planning and 
assessing the adequacy of proposed plans.213  
 This positive model of civil-military interaction was not only transient, but 
it was also strengthened and refined and several more studies on different defense related 
issues were carried out, including the elaboration of NATO Membership Action Plan.   
Plan 2004, the execution of which started in 2000, has four main goals:  
...to make the Armed Forces adequate to the strategic environment 
and in condition to face the challenges of new types of conflicts and crises, 
to have a high level of interoperability with NATO no later than 2001-
2002, to have potential for an effective contribution in crises response 
operations and to have a realistic size in accordance with the level of 
resources the country can provide for defense.214  
 In 2000 structural reforms of the central administration of the Ministry of 
Defense, in accord with similar structures in NATO, were presented. Changes in all 
levels of command structures of the Bulgarian Armed Forces were implemented as well. 
The structure of the General Staff was changed to become adequate to the central 
administration and to consist of NATO-type directorates from J1 to J6.215 Interoperability 
required also gradual changes in all units to resemble the respective formations in NATO 
forces. Priority tasks were establishment and resource provision of Rapid Reaction 
Forces. The restructuring of the units and formations of the BAF was accompanied by a 
reduction in the number of garrisons and barracks.  
 Plan 2004 prescribed harsh changes in personnel, too. The number of 
personnel should be diminished from 107,000 in 1999 to 45,000 in 2004. The personnel 
were to be changed not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. A study in 1999 found 
the same paradox of the changed pyramid of officers’ ranks as in Hungary – comprising 
                                                 
213 Ibid..  
214 Plamen Pantev “Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria: Aspects, Factors, Problems,” in Plamen Pantev (editor) 
Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe a Survey of the National Perspectives and of the Adaptation Process 
to the Partnership for Peace Standards, (Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies 
Institutes Working Group on Crisis Management in South-East Europe Process to the Partnership for Peace Standards, 
2003), 56. 
215 Unified designation in NATO standing for joint command structures dealing respectively with: personnel, 
intelligence, operation plans, logistics, strategic planning and communication and computers. 
74 
56% of all officers, the senior officers outmatched junior ones.216 Together with the 
reduction of personnel, Plan 2004 envisaged repairing the officers’ structure and, as in 
Hungary, a special attention was given to the NCO corps. In order to prevent any future 
misbalances in the officers’ pyramid, the changes, made in the LDAF in 2002, stipulated 
that: by a decree the Council of Ministers defines the number of the military personnel in 
every rank, excluding high officer ranks. This improved additionally the control functions 
of the executive. 217  
 
d. Changed Pattern of Democratic Control  
 After 1997 the armed forces changed qualitatively - recruitment of 
volunteer soldiers started. Soldiers could be women as well as men and this changed 
additionally the structure of the armed forces, now consisting of volunteer and conscript 
soldiers. Now the regular conscript service is 9 months. Those with a bachelor degree and 
higher education serve 6 months. According to the changes of the Military Doctrine made 
in 2002, the Bulgarian Armed Forces should be fully professionalized by 2010.218 The 
optimistic predictions of the Minister of Defense Nikolay Svinarov and the Chief of the 
General Staff General Kolev are that the professionalization will be accomplished till 
2006-2007. If the speed of the reforms remains the same as in Plan 2004, it will be 
accomplished even earlier – during the term of this Parliament.219   
 Another very important area of the exercising democratic control of the 
armed forces is the approval of the defense budget. The National Assembly, through its 
Budget Committee and especially National Security Committee, observes the 
expenditures for defense as presented by the Council of Ministers in the Law on the State 
Budget. During the first years of democracy they were provided with several figures, but 
becoming experienced they asked for more detailed information on defense budget. At 
cise “the power of the purse” because resources were so that time it was hard to exer                                                 
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scarce. And even more, there was an interesting phenomenon when the members of the 
committee from the majority and from the opposition, contrary to the parliamentary 
behavior, “are voted upon, pleading for reallocation of additional resources for the 
MoD.”220 
 A step towards transparency of the defense planning was the introduction 
in 2000 of the Integrated System for Planning, Program Development and Budgeting 
within the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces. The System is a main planning 
system in the Ministry of Defense. It encompasses “national defense and NATO 
requirements, people, weapon systems, and infrastructure; sustaining and modernization 
requirements; policy requirements and resource constraints.”221 The core of the System is 
a program-based budgeting approach which allows resources to be allocated in according 
with the needs and priorities.  
Defense resources are bound to defense/military capabilities within 
six-year programming horizon. Furthermore, it attributes decision-making 
authority to the responsible and accountable persons and permits higher 
transparency of the planning process.222 
 The introduction of the planning, programming and budgeting system 
allows the defense planning process to be overseen in all its stages. The Inspectorate and 
the Financial Audit Directorate additionally facilitate the internal oversight for the 
implementation of the plans and programs within the Ministry of Defense. The Inspector 
General reported directly to the Minister and is supported by a number of civilian and 
military experts in special areas. The Financial Audit Directorate is manned exclusively 
with civilians and also reports directly to the Minister on the results of the financial 
surveys.  
 The Constitution of Republic Bulgaria establishes the National Audit 
Office. It focuses on the ensuring that public funds and resources are spent wisely and in 
accordance with their intended purpose. It provides an oversight of the results, efficiency, 
and effectiveness of how funds are spent by MoD and other organizations. 
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 The Parliamentary oversight is additionally improved by requirements 
posed in the 1998 Concept for National Security and 1997 Amendments to the Law on 
Defense and Armed Forces. According to them, each year the Prime Minister, on behalf 
of the Cabinet, sends to the Parliament a Report on the Status of National Security and a 
Report on the Status of Defense and the Armed Forces.223 This was crucial recently in 
overseeing the implementation of the reform plans. What is more, the open debate on 
these reports is a valuable tool not only for the parliamentary control but also for societal 
information about the real problems of defense. 
 As has been made clear, the UDF government 1997-2001 was the first that 
was able to finish its mandate. It was very successful also in acceleration of defense 
reform and in developing not only structures, but also working patterns of democratic 
control of the armed forces.  
 Although a new political movement – the National Movement Simeon II 
(NMSII) – won the elections in 2001, it confirmed the line of reforms with the same 
tenacity as its predecessors and Bulgaria received the well-deserved invitation to join 
NATO at Prague Summit 2002.  
 Following its ambitious plan for development of the Armed Forces and 
reaching interoperability with NATO as soon as possible, the NMSII government started 
a Strategic Defense Review. This will conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Armed 
Forces and draw up the directions of their development according to the new security 
environment and the available defense recourses. An elaborated vision of the future 
defense needs and the tasks of the armed forces and all the defense components and 
strategy will result from the Strategic Defense Review.224  
 The practical experience gained in the elaboration of the Military Doctrine 
and Plan 2004 has grown. Now there are 21 established working groups which not only 
integrate civilian and military expertise in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, 
but also involve experts from the President’s administration, the Parliament, the Council 
of Ministers, the academic community and NGOs. Such way of dealing with security-
related issues indicates a further development of the understanding of the notion what 
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exactly a democratic control means and the maturity of its implementation through 
involving all powers including representatives of civil society.225  
 
3. Particularities of the Parliamentarian Oversight in Bulgaria 
The parliamentarian oversight is a function of the established standing committees 
– in the case of armed forces the main oversight bodies are the National Security and 
Foreign Policy Committees, which have been integrated into one – Foreign Policy, 
Defense, and Security Committee since 2001. The parliamentarian oversight is not only 
dependent on the education and the political culture of the deputies and especially of the 
committees’ members, but it also depends on the MPs’ desire to debate and discuss 
defense-related issues. Unfortunately as Ratchev points out “[t]he Armed Forces have no 
lobby and no attractive image among the members of the Parliament.”226 There are many 
different explanations for this indifference.   
Assessing the quality of Bulgarian Parliamentarian oversight, in 1998 Jeffrey 
Simon found several deficiencies. One of them is related to the lack of continuity. After 
the elections in 1997 only 8 percent of the deputies had any previous parliamentary 
experience, and more than 60 percent of the MPs had never taken floor. He defines this 
group as the “silent” majority.  
In contrast to other transition states where parliamentary expertise 
is slowly expanding with each Parliament, Bulgaria’s seems to be 
shrinking. This factor affects the quality of Bulgaria’s parliamentary 
oversight.227  
He also found lack of continuity and expertise in the National Security 
Committee. Even though the Committee formally carried out the hearings of the Defense 
Minister and the Chief of the General Staff on budget, defense law, defense reform and 
other defense-related issues. “…the membership [of the Committee] lacks previous 
military and executive defense experience, discussions have been muted, and its ability to 
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critically assess the force structure and budget appears limited.”228 In addition to that, the 
work of the committee suffers also by lack of staff support.  
Since 2001, when the new National Movement Simeon II won the elections, 
continuity is again the weakest point of the 39th National Assembly and National Security 
Committee. Although the pattern has not been changed so much, the current Parliament 
tried to deal with the defense-related issues in a different way. The Parliament decided to 
transform the former National Security Committee into Foreign Policy, Defense and 
Security Committee in order to put closely related issues under the control of one body. 
Only seven of its 28 members have any previous parliamentary experience, but none have 
“an education or previous experience in national defense or armed forces control.” 229  
The 39th National Assembly tries to overcome the lack of staff support. The 37th 
Parliament had two experts, and the 38th - only one. The new members of the National 
Security Committee are more educated /most of them abroad/, and they recognize the 
importance of staff’s expertise. In order to avoid reliance on the experts from the security 
sector institutions, who could be biased, they rely on the partnership with independent 
professional experts and non-governmental organizations. In addition to “the existing 
National Center for Public Opinion Studies, a department for Parliamentarian Research 
and Analysis was established.”230 Ratchev’s assessment about using expertise in the 
work of the Parliament is as follows: 
…the use of experts in the current Parliament has never been 
bigger with regard to all the years of democracy and promises in 
increasing development in quality and spectrum.231 
In conclusion, as a result of the achieved political stability and gained experience 
in democratic parliamentary life, the effectiveness of the work of the Parliament and, 
hence, the effectiveness of the parliamentarian oversight of the armed forces is 
improving.  
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F. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
 
For Bulgaria the international context plays a decisive role in the democratization 
of the civil-military relations. The international context should be divided into several 
factors that formed the specific state of civil-military relations in Bulgaria. These factors 
are the influences of the long lasting conflicts in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and later 
Russian, and the West.  
The traditionally very cautious Bulgarian policy towards Yugoslavia was 
challenged by the ten-year conflict there. The Bulgarian economy suffered by the 
Yugoslavian wars, being perceived as unreliable for the foreign investors because of its 
proximity to the conflict, and from the embargoes posed on Yugoslavia. And finally 
Bulgaria was blamed by Yugoslavian government for its decision to support NATO 
operation “Allied Force.” Since membership in NATO was matter of ensuring the 
security of the country and it was a national priority, Bulgaria opened its sky for NATO 
planes during the crisis in Kosovo.  
From a military point of view the Yugoslav conflicts raised some questions about 
the proper approach towards the reformation of the Bulgarian armed forces. When the 
war is next-door, is there a need of reforms and what kinds of reforms are justifiable. In 
this respect Plamen Pantev mentions that two schools of thoughts existed in Bulgaria in 
1990s.232 The first insisted that given the immediate threat of conflict it is illogical to 
reshuffle the armed forces. It is obvious that the militaries favored this position, and not 
surprisingly the main supporter of this stance was the General Staff. The second position 
was related to the transitional policy of the state. In this view, despite of the wars, the 
defense reform should proceed as all the sectors of national life are under reform. It is 
obvious that in this situation the civil-military relations were being tested and the 
resolution of the question will confirm the adherence to democratic principles.  
An evaluation of the political situation clearly showed that “direct military threats 
to Bulgaria were actually fairly limited in the short to medium term,” which led the 
second school of thought to prevail.233 Reform-minded politicians stand for the stance 
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that establishment of genuine democratic control of the armed forces would even more 
prevent an eventual spillover of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.  
The conflicts in the neighboring disrupting federation could not 
generate, politicize and legitimize a higher role for the military, but rather 
accelerated the adaptation, the conception and education of what 
democratic civilian control over armed forces is and how this could be 
translated into more efficient armed force that guards its nation.234 
During the last decade of 20th century all post-communist countries, including 
Russia, started democratization of their societies. In such conditions Russia was mainly 
engaged with its own problems rather than seeking to keep its influence over the former 
“socialist camp” countries. But when it irrevocably lost its influence of Central Europe, 
Russia directed all its efforts to keep Bulgaria in its political orbit. In this respect 
economical leverages were among the most often used means. Aware of the Bulgarian 
dependence on Russian raw materials, gas and petrol, in 1997-98 Russia established a 
discriminatory customs policy towards Bulgaria. Bulgaria was more vulnerable than the 
Czech Republic and could not just switch on to the Western system of gas transmission 
network, when Russian Company Gazprom tried to intimidate it. Despite the exerted high 
pressure, Kostov’s government, insistent on its pro-Western orientation, continued its 
policy towards integration in NATO and EU. 235  
The bilateral relations were further aggravated when at the end of the Kosovo 
crisis Bulgaria refused to allow the over-flight of Russian military airplanes, which was 
claimed to be a support to KFOR, and did it after the US approved the flight.236   
As in Hungary, the development of the democratic civil-military relations coupled 
with the fading of the Russian influence in Bulgaria. The existing Soviet-type civil-
military relations were tied with the presence of the powerful ideological hegemon – the 
Soviet Union and collective military organization – the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The 
demise of these factors, as well as the strive of Bulgaria for democratization, led to 
enhancement of the western influence.  
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Western model of civil-military relations were seen as an inherent 
part of the development of much broader European security community 
that would serve to enhance Bulgarian national security.237 
The announced firm desire to join NATO and EU in 1997 played an exclusively 
decisive role in canalizing this influence. The provided assistance convinced the state 
elite that the democratization and the democratic control of the military are inseparable. 
What is more, both organizations posed as a requirement the obtaining of a democratic 
relationship between the civil and military authorities within any applicant state. 
Bulgarian co-operation with NATO started in 1990 and it was based on wide 
range of programs and activities. The most important of them are PfP and MAP. Like 
Hungary, Bulgaria joined PfP Initiative when it was issued in 1994 and participated in all 
offered activities and sent officers in NATO structures.  
Following the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), Bulgaria worked hard 
to reach a certain level of interoperability by fulfilling all posed interoperability 
objectives and partnership goals. Bulgaria conducted Force Structure Review in 2002 as 
one of the Partnership goals. The results led to changes in the Military Doctrine and to 
reshaping of Plan 2004, which proved the direct relationship of NATO influence over 
Bulgarian defense reform.238  
NATO assisted the process of democratization of the civil-military relations in 
Bulgaria and the development of certain institutional basis through the Membership 
Action Plan. It was issued by NATO in 1999 and was based on the experience of the 
three new NATO members – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. MAP is directed 
towards preparation of candidate countries to membership objectives. Its main objectives 
are achieving interoperability in the political, economical, defense, security of 
information and legislation areas. Thus it provided the best ground for consolidating the 
democratic institutions and for enhancement of the democratic control of the armed 
forces.239  
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The bilateral co-operation with Western partners was of extreme importance for 
the development of the Bulgarian institutions for democratic control. Bilateral co-
operation could be divided in three aspects: expert and analytical support in introducing a 
certain system of democratic control; providing educational programs; and sending 
experts to provide practical support in place.  
The establishment of working democratic control of the armed forces was assisted 
by the conducted studies on the Bulgarian structures and practices. The conducted in 
1998-99 Bulgarian-UK study on the Parliamentary oversight and democratic control of 
the BAF helped the politicians to realize what the real problems were and what needed to 
be done to overcome them. Then, for conducting a comprehensive defense reform, a 
study international team was formed. General Kievenaar (ret.) from US side and Gen. 
McKenzie from UK supported Bulgarian experts. To improve the system of democratic 
control the study recommendations led to development of the Military Doctrine, Plan 
2004, and the establishment of Defense Planning Directorate as a leading defense 
planning structure within MoD as well as refining the practices of civil-military 
interaction.240  
With NATO countries’ assistance, and mainly with the help of the US, studies of 
C4I systems, air defense, and modernization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces were 
conducted. They contributed again not only military capabilities to be improved, but also 
the structures of the Ministry of Defense to be developed as an establishment of the 
Armament Policy Directorate Situation Center, Transparency Building Center, etc. 241 
Like for the Hungary, many NATO countries offered training and education of 
Bulgarian officers and civilians. They attended a lot of short- and long-term courses, 
which have been of great importance for achieving interoperability and developing civil-
military relations. Such kind of assistance presents an opportunity for establishment of a 
pool of well educated experts, who can help, sharing foreign experience, in establishing 
and exercising the democratic control of the armed forces. Between 1992 and 2001, 852 
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Bulgarian officers, 86 civilians and 4 NCOs received their education in NATO and 
member countries, 256 of them were educated in the U.S.242 
A large number of foreign military consultants supports Bulgarian efforts to catch 
up with NATO requirements. Bulgarian Ministry and General Staff take advantages of 
advice of officers and civilians from the US, UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, 
Greece.243 Foreign experts give support in areas as programming and budgeting, 
development and training of NCOs, logistics, public relations and others. 
 
G. CONCLUSION  
 
Bulgaria has undergone a long way of establishment and improvement of the 
democratic control of the armed forces during the last fourteen years. From the strict 
political control exercised by one party in the past, now the armed forces, the political 
elite and the society are mutually bound with deeply settled democratic civil-military 
relations. This transformation was not smooth and the main reason for that were the 
troubled first years of the transition. Carrying out a regime controlled transition, Bulgaria 
apparently needed time to strengthen its undeveloped arenas of democracy as political, 
economic and civil societies. The democratization of civil-military relations could not be 
separated from the general democratization, therefore, the same reason delayed the 
institutionalization of the democratic control of the armed forces and its implementation 
as an inherent principle of civil-military relations.  
The international context could be considered as the most important among the 
factors that played a decisive role for the democratization of the civil-military relations. 
The combination of international factors helped Bulgaria to find the solution for its 
security dilemma together with establishing of democratic patterns of civil-military 
relations. The Western influence helped also in refining the institutional arrangements 
and made them more effective.  
                                                 
242 Valery Ratchev, and Velizar Shalamanov, and Todor Tagarev, “Reshaping Bulgarian Armed Forces for the 
21st Century,” 223. 
243 Ibid..   
84 
V. CONCLUSION  
The progress of democratization of civil-military relations in post-communist 
countries from Central and East Europe is quite remarkable. The cases of Hungary and 
Bulgaria showed that despite starting from different stages of societal, political and 
economic development they managed in a rather short timeframe to establish basic 
constitutional procedures and primary institutional capacities for democratic control of 
armed forces. In both countries the civilians and military better understand now the roles, 
the functions and the procedures of relationship in democratic civil-military relations. 
 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSAL FACTORS, SHAPING DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
 
Establishment of good arrangements for exerting democratic control of the 
military show that historical legacies did not play a decisive role in forming post-
communist civil-military relations. Although different in their nature, historical traditions 
of both countries during pre-communist and communist times did not present good 
examples of democratic control of the military. When it comes to involvement in 
domestic politics they had different experiences – Hungarian history had no record of 
serious involvement of the military in domestic politics, while Bulgarian military 
conducted several coups d’etat before the communist regime and attempted to overthrow 
the government in the communist time. Nonviolent transitions proved that neither a 
totalitarian (communist) past, nor a non-democratic pre-communist experience is 
determining.  
The military was traditionally not involved in domestic politics in Hungary and 
Bulgaria, and is still not involved in post-communist countries. Many scholars would 
agree that the lack of involvement of the military in domestic politics allowed for a 
smoother transition from totalitarian to democratic control. The military in communist 
countries had never enjoyed any prerogatives to define domestic or foreign policy. 
Therefore they were ready to accept the control by democratically elected governments 
without any contestations. I would add that this issue is twofold and the second part of it 
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concerns the propensity of the political elite to use assistance of armed forces for 
achieving its goals. The type of transition presented an opportunity for all basic 
democratic arrangements to be negotiated before regime change. Therefore there was no 
political will to engage the military to defend a political stance. The transitional period 
forced military and civilians to change their attitude and expectations and to learn how to 
work in a new democratic manner. They naturally changed the pattern of civil-military 
relations.  
The different path of transition of Hungary and Bulgaria meant different starting 
positions in the path to democratic consolidation. Different social, political and economic 
conditions did not play a very significant role in achieving democratization of civil 
military relations, but did play a role in its timing. Negotiated transition in Hungary 
determined a faster and smoother consolidation of democracy. Despite the fact that the 
regime controlled the transition in Bulgaria, it achieved consolidation of democracy 
relatively early. Linz and Stepan find this surprising and have two hypotheses about that: 
– the institutional choice of Bulgaria for a parliamentary system with 
proportional representation, facilitated minorities representation and  
– an especially active pretransitional civil society – Bulgaria was in totalitarian 
stage in term of development of oppositional organizations, but it “had more 
intellectual capital than our category of early-post-totalitarian [state] would 
suggest.”244 
While the consolidation of democracy came to Hungary very early, the Bulgarian 
transition to democracy led to the establishment of democratic institutions, but the 
shadow of regime-controlled transition damaged their performance until 1997. The 
political instability during the period of 1990-97 limited democratic reforms, including 
democratization of civil-military relations. At the same time the negotiated character of 
the transition gave Hungary political stability and allowed for the smooth development of 
democratic civil-military relations. The established institutions employ a democratic way 
of interaction and even started to refine themselves in order to get better performance. 
For example, in 1991, a decision of the Constitutional Court solved a dispute between 
Hungarian President Goncz and Prime Minister Antall. In these cases the path of 
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transition from post-totalitarian regime to democracy is important for the subsequent 
performance of the institutions, but not in their formation. Since democratization of the 
civil-military relations depends on the performance of the institutions it definitely 
influences the speed of the establishment of democratic control of armed forces.   
Although Linz and Stepan assert that return of the former Communist Parties in 
power is not harmful for democracy, the examples of Hungary and Bulgaria show that 
they at least can decelerate democratization of civil-military relations.245 For instance, the 
policy of Hungary’s 1994-1998 socialist-liberal coalition reversed the process of civil-
military reform of the Ministry of Defense inaugurated by the previous conservative 
government. Most of the civilianized positions were remilitarized and more power in 
defense planning and military intelligence were given to the General Staff. The same 
tendency was also present in Bulgaria during 1992-1997 when the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party was able to control some of the governments and even to form its own government 
in 1995-1997. The defense reform was almost a forgotten issue and many posts were 
remilitarized.246  
Comparison of all studied factors shows that Bulgaria and Hungary are different 
in all of them except international influence. International context was characterized by 
long-lasting conflict in Yugoslavia, close to the borders of Bulgaria and Hungary, demise 
of Soviet/Russian influence and gradual enhancement of Western influence. The last one 
seems to have a leading role in the development of civil-military relations since NATO 
and the EU require that applicant states possess respective levels of democratic control of 
armed forces. Especially effective in this aspect were NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
(1994) and Membership Action Plan (1999). Membership Action Plan helped Bulgaria to 
refine its legal basis, to develop its institutional establishment and to improve the 
performance of its institutions.  
International studies on the defense sector of Hungary and Bulgaria, which 
revealed deficiencies in civil-military relations, also assisted institutional development in 
these countries. Education abroad and advisors at home provided by NATO countries 
supported countries’ efforts in specific areas as defense planning, education and many 
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more, and inevitably contribute to the development of the democratization of civil-
military relations, by sharing foreign experience.  
The importance of international influence as a factor to democratization of civil-
military relations depends on internal perception. For example, the Bulgarian president 
supported a close relationship with the international community and even the Parliament 
adopted a declaration in 1993 confirming Bulgaria’s intention to join NATO and WEU. 
However, from 1995 to 1997 the new Socialist government showed a real indifference to 
NATO’s offer for a closer relationship and avoided any firm engagement.247 The 
Hungarian defense minister Keleti, also a Socialist, shared a similar attitude towards 
NATO, which was pushing for reforms in the Ministry of Defense. 
Although ultimately international influence proved to be the most important factor 
leading to the improvement of democratic control of the armed forces, differing internal 
political attitudes determined its effectiveness during transition. A government’s 
perception of international influence stems from its political affiliations. In this respect 
Plamen Pantev stresses that the accusations of Western favoritism are unfounded, rather 
Western support “has produced differentiated results, depending on the different national 
social, political and economic processes.”248  
In Hungary and Bulgaria as parliamentary and multiparty countries, almost all of 
the governments were formed by coalition. Unfortunately, studying coalition culture of 
the post-communist countries is not a subject of this thesis and the proper answer of the 
correlation between international influence and coalition governments’ performance 
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE END-STATE OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF 
ARMED FORCES 
 
1. Analysis of the Development of the Legal Basis 
The adopted legal basis in Hungary and Bulgaria define in detail national security 
strategy and policy (See Table 4.). The development and amendment of these documents 
meets the new aspects of the international security environment and respects NATO 
membership requirements.  
The political climate allowed Hungary to develop its national strategic security 
documents, such as the National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine faster, while in 
Bulgaria civilians were able to take part in this important area after overcoming the 
period of political instability. Development of the legal basis for establishing democratic 
control of armed forces in Hungary and Bulgaria has a lot of commonalities. Despite 
different paths of transition to democracy both countries were very insistent to start 
democratization of the civil-military relations with depolitization of armed forces. This 
task was so imperative that it was fulfilled even before the first democratic elections in 
both countries occurred and new Constitutions were adopted. The new Constitutions were 
adopted as soon as possible. In Hungary, the old 1949-Constitution was amended in 1989 
even before democratic elections in 1990 on a basis of the Round-Table decisions. 
Bulgaria formed а constitutional Great National Assembly, which adopted а new 
Constitution in 1991. The Constitutions define main principles of the democratic control 
of the armed forces, such as chain of command, power and responsibilities of bodies 
involved in democratic control of the armed forces, and the role of the armed forces as 
defenders of national security.  
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The Constitutions in fact established fundamental institutionalization of the 
democratic control of the armed forces. The development of institutional arrangements 
for democratic control of the armed forces was task solved by the adoption of subsequent 
legal documents, such as the Defense Act in Hungary, adopted in 1993, and the Law on 
Defense and Armed Forces in Bulgaria, adopted in 1995. The Hungarian approach 
presents a better example because the plans for long- and mid-term reformation of armed 
forces were made after adoption of National Security Principles (1993), Defense Concept 
(1993) and the Defense Act (1993), which additionally cleared the chain of command and 
states the responsibilities of bodies exercising oversight over the armed forces. The 
sequence in which the laws were adopted first assessed a strategic environment, then 
defined strategic goals, adopted respective missions and tasks of the armed forces and 
defined respective duties of the institutions. This allowed the Hungarian government to 
make well-grounded decisions on reformation of the armed forces. Unfortunately 
political instability in Bulgaria until 1997 did not allow such a sequence to be followed 
and the National Security Concept (1998) and the Military Doctrine (1999) were adopted 
far after the Law on Defense and Armed Forces (1995) was adopted. 
The negotiated path of transition allowed Hungary to develop the legal basis more 
smoothly and consecutively. The general trend of the reforms was accepted by all 
political parties and followed afterward from all coalitions. Bulgaria was able to reach 
consensus only after the 1997 political crisis, which caused the fall of BSP-government 
and initiated a total change of the policy of this party. 
In both countries the maturity of the political leadership accounts for a new more 
realistic approach in defense planning. In the late 1990s in Hungary and Bulgaria 
decisions on structure and size of the armed forces were taken after thorough review of 
existing conditions and according requirements of national and allied security documents, 
and respecting available resources. Both countries carried out Defense Reviews before 
adoption of plans for further long- and mid-term reorganization of their armed forces. 
Unlike in the past, their plans are based on existing resources. 
The democratic control of armed forces depends on the existence of workable 
defense planning mechanism in the Ministry of Defense. Hungary and Bulgaria made 
efforts to establish a workable Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Although 
Hungary made several attempts  
…and the Defense Resource Planning Group developed a Defense 
Resource Management Model for Hungary, difficulty resulted because in 
Hungary resource allocations run from top of the hierarchy down, rather 
than bottom up.249 
In contrast, Bulgaria has achieved better results in this area. The Bulgarian 
experience in implementation of Integrated System for Planning, Programme 
Development, and Budgeting within the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces was 
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established in 2000. During three planning cycles it was refined and there is now a call to 
spread this experience to all ministries to improve transparency and democratic 
control.250  
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2. Analysis of the Institutional Arrangements 
The institutional arrangements of Hungary and Bulgaria are pretty equal. They 
both are parliamentarian republics. The Parliaments are the most important bodies in 
exercising democratic control of the armed forces with clearly defined responsibilities in 
respect to defense and military policy in peace, war and emergencies. They have 
established subsequent committees, which carry out closer supervision of the executive 
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and defense establishment by all democratic means – control of defense budget, 
promotions of high level officers and civilians, and etc. However both countries suffer 
from lack of expertise in the parliaments and in the committees. The reasons stem from 
lack of continuity in the parliaments and lack of traditions in using staffers’ expertise. 
There is still much room for improvement. 
Structures for exercising civilian control of the defense policy through controlling 
the defense budget allocation and expenditure are established at all institutional levels. 
National Audit Offices in Hungary and Bulgaria can make investigations and are 
accountable only to the Parliaments. Respective financial controlling structures are 
established also in governmental and ministerial level, and they are constituted to be 
accountable to civilian authority above the structures they audit, which guarantee their 
impartiality and independence.   
 
Table 5. Bodies, Exercising Oversight and Assisting Decision-Making 
Process in Hungary and Bulgaria – Comparative Analysis 
 
Hungary Bulgaria 
To the Parliaments 
Parliamentary Defense Committee – 
permanent body 
National Security and Foreign Policy 
Committee – permanent body  
State Audit Office National Audit Office 
To the Presidents 
Military Office – permanent body Advisors – permanent body 
 National Security Consultative Council – 
consultative body 
National Defense Council – in war Supreme Headquarters – in war 
To the Councils of Ministers 
National Security Cabinet – consultative 
body 
Foreign and Defense Policy Secretariat – 
assists the National Security Cabinet 
Security Council – consultative body  
Government Supervision Office – 
permanent audit body  
 
To the Ministries of Defense 
MoD Collegium – advisory body Defense Council – advisory bodies  
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The clear chain of command is very important for exercising democratic control 
of the armed forces. Hungary experienced some troubles during first years of transition 
because of the heritage of last communist government, but the Constitutional Court 
successfully met that challenge and proved that Hungary respects democratic principles 
of division of powers. Bulgaria cleared the existing ambiguities of the legal basis by 
development and changes of the Law on Defense and Armed Forces and subsequent 
legislation.  
The effectiveness of exercised democratic control of the defense and military 
policy depends on the performance of all executive levels. Since the defense and military 
policy are important national policies, the existence of consultative bodies, with wide 
representation, to the president and the Council of Ministers to assist the authorities in the 
decision-making process and make it more transparent, is necessary. Such consultative 
bodies were established in Hungary and Bulgaria. The Hungarian president enjoys the 
help of a permanent Military Office, while the Bulgarian president has only advisors, but 
he heads the National Security Consultative Committee, which deliberates every issue 
concerning national security. The Prime Ministers in both countries hold similar positions 
in the security structures; in Hungary – chairman of National Security Cabinet and in 
Bulgaria – chairman of National Security Council, which are inter-agency structures. In 
their decision-making process the defense ministers also are assisted by advisory 
councils, which improve interrelation between military and civilians and employ their 
expertise to come up with appropriate decision (See Table 5 and Appendixes C. and D.).  
The Ministries of Defense in both countries have undergone prominent changes. 
The Hungarian defense ministry was restructured in 2001 to include the General Staff.  
The full integration of the General Staff into the Ministry of Defense was discussed for 
years and Jeffrey Simon asserts that integration is decade-long task, but Hungary made its 
choice and the results are to come soon. Simon thinks that: “If successfully implemented, 
integration might facilitate the flow of defense needs from the armed forces to the 
government, opening up defense policies and activities to public scrutiny and 
accountability,” which is the main task of democratic control of armed forces.252 
Integration would lead to dropping out of duplicated structures from one side, but also to 
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the development of a more creative atmosphere by the improvement of horizontal links 
between experts of the defense ministry and the General Staff on working level. This 
means that in the addition to the diminution of the duplicated structures an integrated 
defense ministry would be more efficient and would provide more effective oversight. 
Since Bulgaria still is creeping on the way of establishing integrated structure of the 
Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, it is imperative to take this decision as soon as 
possible in order to save time and to solve this deficiency before it becomes a member of 
NATO. 
In civilianizing the staff of the ministries Hungary and Bulgaria have had some 
results, but they are criticized for appointing a lot of officers who do not rotate within 
armed forces and therefore their contact with them loses actuality. A possible solution is 
the development of a certain policy for the rotation of military cadres of the defense 
ministry. Another aspect of the problem is that civilian expertise in defense-related issues 
still exists and the development of educational programs for improving their knowledge 




In sum, Hungary and Bulgaria present good examples of successful 
democratization of civil-military relations. Their experiences have positive aspects, 
which could be shared and negative aspects, which have to be avoided. An examination 
of their experience will be very useful for countries aspiring to NATO membership, since 
the establishment of democratic control of armed forces is an essential criteria for 
acceptance. The best results are achieved if political consensus exists and national 
priorities are defined in the outset of the democratic reforms. Hungary managed to 
establish democratic control of the armed forces earlier than Bulgaria in the initial years 
of the democratic change. Although both countries achieved good results, they still need 
to refine the arrangement and the performance of the institutions for democratic control 
of the armed forces, such as the improvement of the effectiveness of the oversight from 
the integrated defense ministry in Hungary and the establishment of such an integrated 

















































APPENDIX A. HUNGARY BEFORE WWI AND AFTER 
THE TREATY OF TRIANON  
(From: World History Maps from KMLA, available http://www.zum.de, 



















































































APPENDIX B. BULGARIA ACCORDING TO THE 
TREATY OF SAN STEFANO AND THE BERLIN 
CONGRESS  
(From: World History Maps from KMLA, available 
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APPENDIX C. CHAIN OF COMMAND IN HUNGARY 
(2002) 
(After: Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military 
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APPENDIX D. CHAIN OF COMMAND OF BULGARIA 
(2002) 
(After: White Book on Defense (Ministry of Defense of Republic of 
Bulgaria, Sofia, 2002) 
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